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INTRODUCTION

Professor Jerome A. Barron argued in his 1967 article, Access to
the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right,' that it was anomalous for the
First Amendment to protect expression once it had come to the fore, but
be indifferent to creating opportunities for expression. He explained that
because of the dominance of the mass media-principally newspapers
and broadcast stations-and the high cost of ownership, most people had
no real opportunity to express their views. Therefore, he argued that the
public's right of access to the media should be recognized as a
constitutional principle. 2
Today's symposium titled "Reclaiming the First Amendment:
Constitutional Theories of Media Reform," marks the fortieth
anniversary of Professor Barron's article. It is intended to explore how
the First Amendment might be used to address the "growing concern
that our current consolidated and commercialized mass media system
represents a serious challenge to our democracy." 3 The symposium
brochure acknowledges, however, that "First Amendment arguments for
government regulation to ensure diversity of viewpoints, have had a
mixed reception in the courts. ' 4
When Professor Barron published his article in 1967, many people
were interested in expanding the idea of public access. The Supreme
Court's 1969 decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,5 which
1. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
2. Id. at 1641, 1666-67.
3. Symposium Description, Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of
Media Reform (2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
4. Id.
5. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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held that the public had a constitutional right to hear competing
viewpoints and that the public's right of access was paramount to
broadcasters' right to speak,6 helped to spur efforts to expand the
public's right of access. 7 But after opening the door to recognizing a
public right of access in Red Lion, the Supreme Court quickly drew back
from the logical extension of that decision. In 1973, the Court declined
to extend the public's right to hear competing views on broadcast
stations to a right to express views on broadcast stations through the
purchase of time for editorial advertisements in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee 8 (CBS). The next year,
the Court found a Florida statute that required newspapers to afford
political candidates a limited right of reply unconstitutional in Miami
HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo.9
This Article analyzes the papers of three former Supreme Court
Justices-Blackmun, Brennan, and Douglas-that are available at the
Library of Congress to better understand why the Court declined the
opportunity to establish a broad, constitutional right of access for the
public.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Barron'sArticle

Professor Barron attributed the tendency of constitutional law to
protect expression but not the opportunity for expression to a "romantic
conception" of the First Amendment ° based on the concept of the
"marketplace of ideas."" He cites as an example of the romantic
conception Justice Douglas's dissent in Dennis v. United States,'
expressing the view that if government can be kept away from ideas, full

6. Id. at 375, 390.
7. See, e.g., Theodore M. Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The
Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427, 463-64 (1975); Roy L. Mason & Robert E.
Ganz, Columbia Broadcasting: Public Access to the Media Denied, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 339, 343
(1973); Comment, The Regulation of Competing First Amendment Rights: A New FairnessDoctrine

Balance After CBS?, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1283, 1288-89 (1974).
8. 412 U.S. 94, 130-32 (1973).
9. 418 U.S. 241,244, 258 (1974).
10. Barron, supra note 1, at 1641.
11. Id. The marketplace of ideas had its origin in Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v.
United States: "the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. 341 U.S. 494, 581-91 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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and free
discussion would keep us from "'embracing what is cheap and
''13
false.
Barron argued that "if ever there were a self-operating marketplace
of ideas, it has long ceased to exist.' 14 He was particularly concerned
that subjects or perspectives in which people were not yet interested but
ought to be, found difficulty in gaining access to the mass media. He
pointed to the civil rights demonstrations and sit-ins as evidence that the
existing media had failed to convey "unorthodox, unpopular, and new
ideas." 1 5
To make the First Amendment work, Barron argued that the Court
must recognize that "[t]here is inequality in the power to communicate
ideas just as there is inequality in economic bargaining power."' 16 The
marketplace of ideas concept assumes that:
[P]rotecting the right of expression is equivalent to providing for it.
But changes in the communications industry have destroyed the
equilibrium in that marketplace.... A realistic view of the first
amendment requires recognition that a right of expression is somewhat
thin if it can be exercised
only at the sufferance of the managers of
17
mass communications.
Barron also questioned the assumption that the First Amendment
should afford equal protection to all types of media despite enormous
differences in impact. By "confusing freedom of media content with
freedom of media to restrict access," the Court "obscures the
fact.., that problems of access and impact vary significantly from
medium to medium." 18 He pointed out the irony that Justice Black's
insistence on avoiding favoritism by treating all media the same actually
had the effect of favoring mass media (newspapers, broadcasting,
motion pictures) over media that was freely available such as sound
trucks and pamphlets. Barron asked, "[i]f a group seeking to present a
particular side of a public issue is unable to get space in the only
newspaper in town, is this inability compensated by the availability of
the public park or the sound truck?" 19

13.

Barron, supra note 1, at 1642-43 (quoting Dennis, 341 U.S. at 584).

14.

ld. at 1641.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1647.
1647-48 (footnote omitted).
1651.
1653.
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Barron recognized that First Amendment claims require a showing
of state action. 20 But, he observed that "[t]oday ideas reach the millions

largely to the extent that they are permitted entry into the great
metropolitan
dailies,
news
magazines,
and
broadcasting
networks.... Only the new media of communication can lay sentiments
before the public, and it is they rather than the government who can most
effectively abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity for an idea
to win acceptance., 21 He argued that "[a] constitutional prohibition
against governmental restrictions on expression is effective only if the
Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion. 22 Since
only the mass media provide an adequate opportunity, they must
accommodate the interests of others who wish to speak.
Barron asserted that the right to be heard should be recognized as a
constitutional principle.23 He discussed several contemporaneous cases
suggesting that such a right could be fashioned by the courts
independently of legislation.24 Barron described the D.C. Circuit
decision in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.

FCC 5 (UCC), as "one of the most significant cases in public law in

20. Id. at 1655.
21. Id. at 1655-56.
22. Id. at 1656.
23. Id. at 1656, 1678.
24. Barron regarded the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as
a "lost opportunity." Id. at 1656, 1659. He found it paradoxical that the Court predicated protection
for newspapers against libel from public officials on the "'principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"' but showed no concern as to whether debate would
in fact be assured. Id. at 1657 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
He concluded that "[u]nless the Times doctrine is deepened to require opportunities for the public
figure to reply to a defamatory attack, the Times decision will merely serve to equip the press with
some new and rather heavy artillery which can crush as well as stimulate debate." Id. Next, he
considered Ginzburg v. United States, which held that dissemination of books violated a federal
obscenity statute because printed material represented "commercial exploitation of erotica solely for
the sake of their prurient appeal." 383 U.S. 463, 466 (1966). Barron saw in this case "the seeds of a
new pragmatic approach to the first amendment guarantee of free expression." Barron, supra note 1,
at 1662. He argued that if the dissemination of books could be prohibited where the dissemination is
for commercial exploitation, "it would seem that the mass communications industry, no less
animated by motives of 'commercial exploitation,' could be legally obliged to host competing
opinions and points of view." Id. (quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 466). He noted that in writing for
the Court, Justice Brennan found it appropriate to determine whether the social importance claimed
for the material was "'pretense or reality."' Id. at 1663 (quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 470).
Likewise, in Barron's view, the mass media "should not be allowed to resist controls designed to
promote vigorous debate and expression by cynical reliance on the first amendment." Id.
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This decision was one of the last written by Warren
Burger before he was appointed to the Supreme Court. This case grew out of the struggle for civil
rights. The petitioners alleged that television station, WLBT, in Jackson, Mississippi, had failed to
serve the significant African American population and had violated the Fairness Doctrine by failing
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recent years. It is unfortunate that the constitutional basis of the case,
though readily discernable, was not made more explicit. '26 Barron
asserted that this case marked "the beginning of a judicial awareness that
our legal system must protect not only the broadcaster's right to speak
but also, in some measure, the public rights in the communications
process.,2 7 At the same time, he recognized that then-Judge Burger's
opinion for the D.C. Circuit distinguished between a newspaper, which
can be operated at the whim of its owners, and a broadcast station, which
is "burdened by enforceable public obligations. 28 Barron questioned the
validity of this distinction in light of the fact that the number of
broadcast stations exceeded the number of newspapers.29
Barron suggested that courts might afford individuals and groups
who wish to express views on public issues a right of nondiscriminatory
access to newspapers.30
[Such a right] might be predicated on Justice Douglas's open-ended
"public function" theory which carried a majority of the Court in
Evans v. Newton. Such a theory would demand a rather rabid
conception of "state action," but if parks in private hands cannot
escape the stigma of abiding "public character," it would seem that a
newspaper, which is the common journal of printed communication in
the constitutional restrictions which
a community, could not escape
31
quasi-public status invites.
Another option would be to secure the right of access through
legislation. Barron argued that "ifCongress were to pass a federal right
of access statute, a sympathetic court would not lack the constitutional
text necessary to validate the statute. If the first amendment is read to
32
state affirmative goals, Congress is empowered to realize them.
Moreover, attempts by states to implement a right of access to promote
an informed citizenry would not conflict with the First Amendment.
to present viewpoints inconsistent with the segregationist viewpoints of its owners. Id. at 998. The
D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's determination that representatives of the viewing public lacked
standing to raise these claims. Id. at 1009.
26. Barron, supra note 1,at 1664.
27. Id. at 1665.
28. Id. at 1665-66 (quoting UCC, 359 F.2d at 1003).
29. Id. at 1666.
30. Id. at 1667. Barron notes that in one case, a court in Ohio recognized a right of access, in
which the court held that purchase of advertising should be open to members of the public on the
same basis, especially when the newspaper isthe only one. Id. However, several other courts had
held otherwise. Id. at 1667 n.68. None of these cases were based on First Amendment analysis. Id.
at 1667-68.
31. Id. at 1669 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 1676.
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Finally, Barron argued that the UCC case suggested the administrative
feasibility of a right of access.
B. Red Lion
Two years after Barron published his article, the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the right of reply for an individual personally
attacked on the air against the claim that requiring a broadcast station to
afford time for reply violated the First Amendment rights of the
broadcaster.33 A Pennsylvania radio station had aired a broadcast by the
Reverend Billy James Hargis attacking Fred Cook, the author of a book
criticizing Barry Goldwater. Cook demanded free time to reply and the
station refused. The FCC ruled that under the Fairness Doctrine, the
station was required to provide Cook with free time to reply.34 The
station appealed and the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC.35 This case was
consolidated with another appeal from the Seventh Circuit.36 In that
case, the FCC had adopted rules clarifying a licensee's responsibilities
under the Fairness Doctrine in the cases of personal attacks and political
editorials. The Radio Television News Director Association challenged
these rules, and the Seventh Circuit found they violated the First
Amendment.3 7
The opinion for the Court, written by Justice White, rejected the
claims of broadcasters that the rules abridged their First Amendment
rights. It began by observing that the "differences in the characteristics
of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them. ' ' 38 Next, it noted that "[w]here there are substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish. 3 9 Moreover,
33. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969). Justice Douglas did not
participate in the decision. Id. at 401.
34. The Fairness Doctrine generally required broadcast stations to cover controversial issues
of public importance and to do so fairly by presenting both sides of controversial issues. Id. at 367.
35. Id. at 372-73; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
36. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 370-71; Radio Television News Dir. Ass'n v. United
States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
37. Radio Television News Dir.Ass'n, 400 F.2d at 1020.
38. Red Lion Broad. Co., 396 U.S. at 386. The decision analogizes broadcasters to sound
trucks: "Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so
noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech ... [t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster...
does not embrace the right to snuff out the free speech of others." Id. at 387.
39. Id. at 388.
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[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations
to present those views and voices which are representative of his
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
community and
40
airwaves.
the
While the decision acknowledged that broadcasters have First
Amendment rights, it gave greater weight to the public's First
Amendment rights:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the Government itself or a private licensee. "[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government." It is the right of the public to receive suitable
moral, and other ideas and
access to social, political, esthetic,
41
experiences which is crucial here.
The Court concluded that it was not:
[I]nconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a
broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the
course of discussing controversial issues, or to require that the political
opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to
communicate with the public. Otherwise, station owners and a few
networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to
the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public
issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with
whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment42for
unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.
While the Red Lion decision did not cite Barron's article, it lent
support to a number of his ideas. 43 First, it found that requiring a right of
40. Id. at 389.
41. Id. at 390 (citations omitted) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
42. Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
43. Barron's article was cited in the briefs of the government and the amicus Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ. Brief for Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ, et al. at 28 n.44, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (Nos. 2, 717);
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reply was constitutional as applied to broadcasters. Second, it recognized
that different media may need to be treated differently under the First
Amendment. Third, it expressed concern that in the absence of the
Fairness Doctrine, the wealthy few would have the ability to express
their views and suppress those with which they disagreed. And finally, it
recognized the public's paramount First Amendment right to have access
to ideas. 4 The Court embraced the marketplace of ideas metaphor, but
recognized that for the marketplace to work, it could not be monopolized
45
by either government or private interests.
III.

CBS

Shortly after Red Lion, the Court had an opportunity to consider
whether the public's First Amendment right of access to ideas required
that broadcasters sell time for the expression of political views. The case
arose when an antiwar group, the Business Executives Move for
Vietnam Peace (BEM), sought to purchase time to air spot
announcements urging immediate withdrawal from Vietnam on WTOP,
a news-oriented radio station in Washington, D.C., owned by PostNewsweek. The station declined to sell time, citing its policy against the
sale of spot advertisements on controversial issues. BEM filed a
complaint with the FCC alleging that the station's refusal violated the
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment and asking the FCC to order
the station to air its advertisements.46
The FCC denied BEM's complaint. It found that WTOP's policy of
refusing to sell time was not a per se violation of the Fairness Doctrine
and that WTOP had exercised reasonable, good faith judgment in its
coverage of the Vietnam war.47 The FCC rejected BEM's assertion that
WTOP had frustrated the public's right to receive suitable access
established in Red Lion because it found that the licensee itself had
presented contrasting views on the Vietnam war. Although BEM had
relied principally upon Red Lion, the FCC interpreted Red Lion as
"stressing the essential nature of the fairness doctrine, rather than the
48
right of particular spokesmen to obtain access to the air.",
Brief for the United States and the FCC at 56, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(Nos. 2, 717), 1969 WL 120257.
44. See Red Lion Broad.Co., 395 U.S. at 375, 386, 390, 392.
45. Id. at 390.
46. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 98-100 (1973); Bus.
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 242-43 (1970).
47. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d at 246-48.
48. Id. at 247-48.
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BEM's appeal was considered together with the appeal of another
Committee.49
FCC case decided the same day, Democratic National
After the CBS network refused to sell time to the Democratic National
Committee (DNC), citing a policy of selling time to political parties only
during election periods, the DNC requested a declaratory ruling that
broadcasters may not as general policy refuse to sell time to responsible
entities for comment on public issues. Relying on Red Lion, the DNC
argued that that CBS's refusal to accept paid programming on
controversial public issues violated the public's right to hear contrasting
views on issues of public importance. 5 °
The FCC denied the DNC's request. It noted that under Red Lion, a
licensee could not rule off coverage of important issues because of its
private beliefs, but must rather act as a trustee for the public. Because
the DNC had not alleged that CBS or any other licensee failed to comply
the DNC request as
with the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC interpreted
51
policy.
seeking to overrule the public trustee

The Commission found that requiring licensees to sell time for
comment on public issues would run counter to the Communications Act
and legislative history which had rejected treating broadcasters as
common carriers. 52 While acknowledging the DNC's reliance on Red
Lion, the FCC read Red Lion differently. It concluded as it did in BEM,
that Red Lion stressed the right of the pubic to be informed, not the right
of any individual or group to speak over broadcast facilities. Moreover,
it was concerned that requiring broadcasters to sell time to anyone who
wanted it could result in a chaotic situation and would allow the public
agenda to be set by affluent groups.53 Thus, the FCC concluded that "the
present system of regarding licensees as trustees, with a duty to present
contrasting viewpoints through representative spokesmen, is
constitutionally sound and of greater public benefit than the concept of
",54
an individual right of access ....
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson issued lengthy dissents in both
cases. His dissent in BEM started from the premise, similar to the one
articulated by Barron, that the First Amendment protects not just the
right to speak but the right to reach an audience, that is, to

49.

Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 97; In re Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d

216 (1970).
50. DemocraticNat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d at 216-17.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 222-23, 230.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 224-27.
Id. at 228 (citation omitted).
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communicate.5 5 Johnson set forth multiple grounds for concluding that
WTOP's refusal to accept the BEM advertisements constituted state
action, and thus invoked the First Amendment.5 6 He concluded that
WTOP was a forum for the communication of ideas that had opened
itself up to the public by making commercial time available for sale, and
thus its refusal to sell time to BEM violated the First Amendment. 7
Johnson's dissent in DNC similarly made broad constitutional and
policy arguments in support of the public's right of access. He suggested
that if the media were not opened up, those who tried to "work[] within
the system" would become frustrated and turn to violence.58 He argued
that the FCC had permitted a system of broadcasting to develop in which
private broadcasters served as both moderators and speakers. Moreover,
this system provided "an individual right of access.., but only for
hucksters of industrial garbage. Anyone wishing to discuss war, peace,
mental health, or the suffering of the poor, must seek out a corporate
59
'trustee,' appointed by the government, to speak for him."
Johnson urged the FCC and the courts to develop "guidelines for
'reasonable' access to the broadcast frequencies, seeking to ensure that
the electronic media of twentieth century communication are as open to
the public as the soap boxes, public parks, and town hall meetings of the
last century." 60 He suggested, for example, that the FCC could require
licensees to accept paid political programming for up to five percent of
their schedules on a first-come, first-served basis.61 In response to the
majority's argument that this proposal would allow the wealthy to
dictate the public agenda, he observed that the "short answer is that
[they] already [do]." 62 Partial access for purchase would at least open a
closed system to partial dissent.63

55. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 249 (1970). In fact,
Commissioner Johnson cites Barron's HarvardLaw Review article in two places. Id. at 262 (quoting
Barron for proposition that the marketplace of ideas no longer functions well and that the mass
media is suppressing opinion); id. at 264 (citing Barron and others as recognizing that access is
required under the First Amendment to create a true marketplace of ideas).
56. Id. at 254-60, 264.
57. Id. at 266, 274.
58. In re Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 231 (1970).
59. Id. at 232-33.
60. Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d at 267.
61. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d at 235.
62. Id. at 235-36.
63. Id. at 236.
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The D.C. CircuitDecision

Both BEM and the DNC appealed to the D.C. Circuit. In a two-toone decision written by Judge Wright, the court reversed the FCC and
remanded for further proceedings. 64 Specifically, the court held that "a
flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the First
Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcements are
accepted.,65 The court limited the holding, noting that it was not
requiring that the planned announcements be accepted. Rather, it left it
to the FCC to develop and administer reasonable procedures for editorial
advertisements.66
Because the statutory and constitutional arguments were
interrelated, the court found that it could not avoid the constitutional
question. It noted that the broadcast media was affected by strong First
Amendment interests, but that the nature of those interests was
evolving.67 The most important recent development was the Supreme
Court's decision in Red Lion, which the D.C. Circuit characterized as "a
clarion call for a new public concern and activism regarding the
broadcast media., 68 While Red Lion did not directly reach the issue in
these cases, it contained expansive 69 language addressing the
impermissibility of "'private censorship.',,
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the reach of the First Amendment
did not depend on "public"-"private" technicalities but on the public
70
character and importance of the enterprise for communicating ideas. It
found that several factors, taken together, brought broadcast licensees
within the ambit of the First Amendment. First, broadcasting was
heavily dependent upon the government and extensively regulated.
Second, the FCC had given it "imprimatur" to the flat ban against
controversial ads. Third, broadcasting was an important medium for the
communication of ideas that had replaced the soap box orator and
leafleteer.71
The court noted that the FCC decisions at issue dealt only with
advertising time, and thus broadcasters had no strong speech interests

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 646.
Id.at 646, 665.
Id.at 649.
at 650.
id.
Id. at 651 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969)).
Id.
Id. at 651-54.
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compared to program time. 72 Moreover, it found that the public had a
First Amendment interest in the mode as well as the content of public
debate. Citing Red Lion, it observed that the purpose of the First
Amendment was to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.7 3 Even
if broadcasters presented a full spectrum of viewpoints on nonadvertising time, their retention of total editorial control was inimical to
the First Amendment because the public needed exposure to a robust
exchange of ideas. Thus, the court concluded that the Fairness
Doctrine's goal of full and fair coverage during programming did not
eliminate the public interest in the further, complementary airing of
controversial views during advertisements. 74 It rejected the FCC's claims
that requiring access would lead to chaos or allow the wealthy to
dominate public debate, noting that each of these concerns could be
addressed through reasonable regulation.7 5
Barron and other advocates for public access surely must have been
heartened by the D.C. Circuit holding that the First Amendment required
the FCC to afford the public some right of access to broadcast stations.
Yet, their optimism was soon cut short by the Supreme Court's decision
to take the case.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The FCC, CBS, ABC, and Post-Newsweek sought Supreme Court
review of the D.C. Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court's decision,
issued on May 29, 1973, had six written opinions. While seven Justices
voted to reverse the D.C. Circuit, they lacked consensus on the rationale
for reversal. Since the D.C. Circuit had found that a broadcast station's
"flat ban" on paid public issue announcements violated the First
Amendment, the Court could reverse either by finding that the First
Amendment was not implicated because there was no state action or that
the First Amendment allowed a flat ban on paid public issue
announcements.
The main opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, found
both. This opinion has four parts. Part I, joined by four other Justices,
began with a discussion of Red Lion, noting that the broadcast media
posed unique and special problems and involved an unusual First
72. Id. at 654.
73. Id. at 655.
74. Id. at 656, 658.
75. Id. at 663-65. Judge McGowan dissented on the grounds that a right of access would be
difficult to administer and was not compelled by the First Amendment. Id. at 666-67 (McGowan, J.,
dissenting).
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Amendment order. Balancing the First Amendment interests was
described as a "task of a great delicacy," which warranted great
deference to Congress and the FCC.7 6 Part II, joined by the same
Justices, recounted the origins of the modem system of broadcast
regulation, citing earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Red Lion.77
Part III addressed the state action question. It concluded that the
action complained of was the result of private, independent journalistic
decisions. Since the government was not a partner to these actions, there
was no state action.7 8 This part was joined only by Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist.
Part IV, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and
Blackmun, purported to address "whether the 'public interest' standard
of the Communications Act requires broadcasters to accept editorial
advertisements or, whether assuming governmental action, broadcasters
are required to do so by reason of the First Amendment., 79 After noting
that "the 'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference to First
Amendment principles," 80 the remainder of this section addressed the
Communications Act, the Fairness Doctrine, and the positions of the
FCC and D.C. Circuit, without any detailed constitutional analysis. It
found that application of the Fairness Doctrine to editorial
advertisements could jeopardize the efficient operation of the doctrine
and subordinate the public interest to private interests.81 It rejected the
lower court view that speakers are the best judge of what the public
ought to hear, noting that "[flor better or worse, editing is what editors
are for.",82 It found that the lower court discounted the difficulties of
implementing a right of access, which would require substantial
governmental oversight.83 It also rejected the claim of discrimination
between commercial and editorial advertisements, finding that none of
the cited cases involved a forum with a statutory duty to provide full and
fair coverage of issues such as that imposed on broadcasters by the
Fairness Doctrine. 84 However, the Court did not completely close the
76. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973).
77. Id. at 103-05. It also discusses the legislative history of the Communications Act, in
particular, the Dill amendment, which rejected the regulation of broadcast stations as common
carriers. Id. at 105-14.
78. Id. at 119-21 (plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 121 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 122-32.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 125-27.
84. Id. at 129-30.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/5

14

Campbell: A Historical Perspective on the Public's Right of Access to the M
2007]

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

door to the idea of a public right of access. It noted that Congress or the
FCC could devise a limited right of access in the future,
and the FCC
85
had in fact opened a proceeding to study the options.
Two of the concurring opinions center on the question of state
action. Justice White's concurring opinion explained that he did not join
Part III of the Chief Justice's opinion because he thought state action
was implicated.8 6 Assuming state action, and given the constitutionality
of the Fairness Doctrine, allowing broadcasters to choose how to comply
with the Fairness Doctrine did not violate the First Amendment.8 7 Justice

Blackmun's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Powell, stated that
because Part IV concluded that assuming governmental action, the First
Amendment did not compel broadcasters to accept editorial ads, "the
governmental action issue does not affect
the outcome of the case."
88
Thus, he would "refrain from deciding it."

Two other concurring opinions articulated different reasons for
reversing the decision below. In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Douglas
argued that commercial licensees should not be treated any differently
than newspapers and requiring access.to newspapers would obviously
constitute unconstitutional government intrusion.8 9 Douglas also noted
that he did not participate in Red Lion and "with all respect, would not
support it. The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment
regime.' 90
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion indicated that his views were
close to those of Justice Douglas. He "agreed with the Court in Red
Lion, although with considerable doubt, because [he] thought that that
much Government regulation of program content was within the outer
limits of First Amendment tolerability." 91 He observed that were the
Commission to require broadcasters to accept editorial advertising under
the public interest standard, the case would be analogous to Red Lion.
But, here the Court of Appeals, not the FCC, held that the First
Amendment compelled broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements.
This, Justice Stewart found, reflected "an extraordinarily odd view of the
First Amendment. 9 2

85. Id. at 131.
86. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
87.

Id. at 147.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 147-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 148-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 132, 138 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 138-39.
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Justice Stewart also elaborated on his reasons for joining in Part III
of the opinion concerning state action. He explained: "The First
Amendment protects the press from government interference .... To
hold that broadcaster action is governmental action would... strip
broadcasters of their own First Amendment rights" and would produce a
result "wholly at odds with the broadcasting system established by
Congress. 9 a He declined to join Part IV of the Court's opinion, which
he understood to address the statutory argument. Noting that the two
other concurring Justices saw Part IV as a discussion of the First
Amendment, he commented that the conflation of these two issues was
"quite wrong ... for the simple reason that the First Amendment and the
public interest standard of the statute are not coextensive." 94 He also
expressed concern that affirming the lower court decision would "lead to
the conclusion that the First Amendment requires that newspapers, too,
be compelled to open their pages to all comers. 95
Justice Brennan's dissent, which Justice Marshall joined, finds
government action. He concluded that:
[G]iven the confluence of these various indicia of "government
action"-including the public nature of the airwaves, the
governmentally created preferred status of broadcasters, the extensive
Government regulation of broadcast programming, and the specific
governmental approval of the challenged policy-I can only conclude
that the Government "has so far insinuated itself into a position" of
participation in this policy that the absolute refusal of broadcast
licensees to sell air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out
on controversial issues of public importance
must be subjected to the
96
restraints of the First Amendment.
He found that "the Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, [was]
insufficient-in theory as well as in practice-to provide the kind of
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' exchange of views to which the
public is constitutionally entitled. 97 Broadcasters faced strong economic
incentives to limit the variety and controversial nature of their coverage.
Moreover, the public had an interest in "receiving ideas and information
directly from the advocates of those ideas without the interposition of
journalistic middlemen," and to hear new and unorthodox ideas.9 8
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 180-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
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Justice Brennan made arguments similar to those made in Barron's
article:
[The right of self-expression] can flourish only if it is allowed to
operate in an effective forum-whether it be a public park, a
schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television
frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication,
the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. 99
Brennan also noted that:
[A]lthough "full and free discussion" of ideas may have been a reality
in the heyday of political pamphleteering, modem technological
developments in the field of communications have made the soapbox
orator and the leafleteer virtually obsolete. And, in light of the current
dominance of the electronic media as the most effective means of
reaching the public, any policy that absolutely denies citizens access to
the airwaves necessarily renders even
the concept of "full and free
100
discussion" practically meaningless.
Brennan recognized that broadcasters have First Amendment rights,
but these rights must be balanced against the rights of others. And in
striking that balance, he emphasized:
[T]hese cases deal only with the allocation of advertising time-air
time that broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without the
retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are concerned here,
not with the speech of broadcasters themselves, but, rather, with their
"right" to decide which other individuals will be given an opportunity
to speak in a forum that has already been opened to the public.
Justice Brennan pointed out that there was "no majority for the
holding that the challenged ban does not violate the 'substance' of the
First Amendment" because the views of Chief Justice Burger and Justice

99. Id. at 192-93. The dissent cites Barron's Harvard Law Review article for the point that
broadcasters tend to permit only established views to enter the "marketplace of ideas." Id. at 188
n.24. It also quotes Barron's article for the point that the inability of some groups to communicate
has led to sit-ins and demonstrations to get the attention of the press. Id. at 190 n.27.
100. Id. at 196.
101. Id. at 199-200 (footnote omitted).
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rendered dictum by their conclusion that there was no
Rehnquist were
10 2
state action.
C. Insightsfrom the Justices' Papers
1. The Views of Justice Blackmun and His Clerk
The Bench Memo written by Ralph I. Miller, Justice Blackmun's
clerk, summarized the arguments in the briefs and discussed the
issues. °3 He asked: "How would spot advertising on minority Views
affect the country?" 10 4 He noted that the parties seem to assume that
"liberal elements" would benefit from requiring access for editorial
advertisements. But he was "concerned... that corporate America may
be the real winner. 10 5 He was also concerned about increasing
government involvement: "The pervasiveness of television increases the
danger that the electorate may become a nation of sheep. Government
involvement in the content of programming is now firmly established by
Red Lion, but this case invites the Court to constitutionally compel a
further intrusion of the government into the information business.' 0 6
Under the heading "Precedents," Miller discussed only one case:
Red Lion. He noted:
Language in the opinion stresses the notion that licensees are given
frequency monopolies out of a practical necessity and that the public
retains an interest in the content of the material aired over those
frequencies. Red Lion is quite important for some of the issue, but Red
Lion does not resolve the case.
As to whether there was state action, Miller characterized the
"policy basis for state action" as:
[A] balancing of the amount of governmental involvement (including
the amount of power placed in private hands by the government)
against the strength of the private rights of the entity at issue
102. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the decision for the Court in Part IV leaves
the door open to the FCC or Congress to devise limited right of access in the future, neither has
taken up this invitation.
103. Bench Memorandum from RIM [Ralph I. Miller] to Justice Harry Blackmun (Oct. 4,
1972), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863
(Library of Congress).
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 24-25.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id. at 25-26.
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(including 9th A[mendment] privacy, 1st A[mendment] associational
"substantive due process" privacy,
privacy, and 5th A[mendment]
10 8
whatever those may connote).

He then noted that "Red Lion seems almost controlling on the state
action issue to me. Red Lion makes it clear that the frequency assigned

to a broadcaster is not his private demesne."' 10 9 He explained:

The broadcaster seems to have a very limited right of privacy (of any
flavor). Conversely, the amount of power delegated to the licensee is
enormous. DNC urges the ability of television to turn the tides in a
Presidential election. Vice President Agnew has expressed similar
sentiments. Whether the lease of public airwaves or 'extensive
regulation' approach is used, I think it is rather easy to find that the
general policies of broadcasters (as sharply distinguished from the
time-slot by time-slot decisions) are state action. Only alfeneral policy
banning all controversial advertisements is at issue here.
On the merits, Miller found that the Petitioners' "strongest
argument... is that the fairness doctrine ...provides the best protection
of the public right to know."' 11 He noted that the "broadcasters would
prefer to stay with the benevolent fairness approach (which they opposed
violently in Red Lion) rather than to lose more of their control over
spokesmen selection." '" 2 In his view, the strongest argument against the
Fairness Doctrine was that the format and mode of response were
controlled by the network. 1 3 His "personal feeling [was] that the
fairness doctrine ha[d] worked remarkably well" and that it could be
enlarged. 114 Nonetheless, he was concerned that the system mandated by
the lower court would raise administrative problems that would
inevitably draw the FCC into a "multitude of disputes" and require
substantial court involvement. 15 He concluded:

108. Id. at 27. Miller suggests a way that the issue of state action might be avoided, but admits
that the argument is "rather weak," none of the briefs make it, and it could be criticized as
"intellectually dishonest." Id.
109. Id. at 28. In support, Miller quotes from Red Lion: "No one has a First Amendment right
to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency." Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 389 (1969)).
110. Id. at 28.
Ill. Id. at 29.
112. Id.
113.

Id.

114.
115.

Id. at 30.
Id.
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I think the Court of Appeals went too far too fast. The need for input
from without the broadcasting industry is great, but the 'advertorial' is
a questionable technique for meeting that need. More FCC action is
required. I would recommend that the [Court of Appeals] judgment be
vacated and that the case be remanded to the FCC for a feasibility
study of ways to provide independent program input. When the issue
comes to the Court again, it should be more refined. The opinion will
be difficult to write, but I think an opinion could be written which
would indicate the importance of individual access (because of needs
of the public to see original presentations; not because every citizen
has a right to be on TV) but which would stress the need for a
workable system drawn from a -reat range of alternatives, including,
but not limited to, paid editorials.
Justice Blackmun set out his view of the case in handwritten notes
that seem to have been written in anticipation of the oral argument. He
wrote:
The next step beyond Red Lion
Red Lion does not give us the answer here
Note that in Red Lion, the broadcasters opposed the fairness doctrine
So generally disturbing elements to me in the court of appeals decision
1. Elevates to constitutional level the right of access
2. This would involve the courts in all kinds of Constitutional
questions-a great flood
3. The rich-poor differentiation would ensue
4. Ignores that the fairness doctrine has worked well
5. Ignores enforcement aspects
Clearly we deal here with a limited facility
1. The FCC has expressed the statute's reasonableness,
discretionarily administered
A public trustee concept
2. The Congress has rejected specifically the common carrier
aspect
I get the impression that the fairness doctrine has found approval as
well, and that it is consistent with [First Amendment] values.
I am inclined to reverse because court of appeals went too far too fast
1. The fairness doctrine is itself workable
2. Has a statutory rather than a constitutionalbase
116. Id.at32-33.
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Can be admin with general appropriateness
Despite a tendency here and there toward mediocre noncontroversial, not all media (cf. newspapers) would be content
so to do
5. Constitutional imposition would ruin it
6. Opening the door fails to account for the limitations
7. Opens the way to differentiation by wealth...
8. True, it does tend to emphasize the commercial over the
political
9. Opens way to more insidious and pervasive governmental
control and censorship
10. Any disadvantages can be alleviated by the FCC regulations
11. Let FCC work out feasibility study as to increased input
3.
4.

We must face the constitutional (i.e. state action) issue-cannot be
avoided. If, however, we go off on the statute, legislative history
supports petitioners
On the constitutional, there is state action hidden in the woodworkRed Lion
If we grant the presence of state action, so what-respondents do not
necessarily win
I prefer to stay on the statute-But can we?' 17
2. The Views of the Justices at the Conference
Oral argument was held on October 16, 1971. At the conference
held four days later, the Justices voted six to three to reverse the lower
court decision. The Chief Justice voted to reverse. He thought that Judge
McGowan's dissent was correct. He saw the case as presenting a
"political not a 1st Amendment matter."1'18 He found the FCC's position
rational and that the alternative would lead to "bedlam."' 1 9 He was also
concerned that a right of access would "give wealthy the power to speak,
every nut with money to do this-he
not others-FCC should not allow
120
act."
to
Congress
would wait for

117. Justice Blackmun's Notes from Oct. 20, 1972 Conference on Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999,
Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972
Conference Notes].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Justice Douglas's Notes from Oct. 20, 1972 Conference on Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866
(Library of Congress) [hereinafter Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes].
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Justice Douglas voted to affirm the lower court. He did "not see
offhand how government can adopt this blanket program," and indicated
that he would like to see what the FCC does. 21 His own notes of the
conference state: "These are public licensees dealing with federal
airspace-Court of Appeals sent it back for rules-the case is really
premature until we have the rules. ' 2
Justice Brennan also voted to uphold the lower court decision. He
emphasized that the lower court had only-held that a flat ban offended
the First Amendment. 23 Justice Brennan thought that there was both
government action and a First Amendment problem, and in that c6ntext,
124
the lower court did not go too far.
Justice Stewart voted to reverse because he felt "strongly" that there
was no government action. 125 He observed:
When FCC limits a broadcaster, that is government action. But cannot
say the broadcaster's action is government action. First Amendment
too far for me. Then a broadcaster could not edit etc. Country has
chosen not to have government broadcasting. Red Lion is a difficult
case for me. I prefer less rather than more government restriction on
broadcasting. FCC has refrained from pushing broadcaster around.
Had they said you must accept advertising, then a genuine first
amendment issue. 126

Justice White voted to reverse as well. He found the statutory
argument "absurd," but thought the case posed a First Amendment
issue. 127 While he believed that the Fairness Doctrine was mandated by
the Constitution and required a broadcaster to act as a proxy for many

121. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117.
122. Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra-note 120.
123. Id.
124. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117. Douglas's notes
attribute to Brennan "there is a 1st A[mendment] interest here-it's government action." Justice
Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 120.
125. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117.
126. Id. Justice Douglas's notes similarly report Stewart's views: "FCC action restraining a
licensee is government action-there is none here-broadcasters are not a government agency-if
so, the 1st A[mendment] would bar them from barring anyone. Red Lion was difficult case for
him-otherwise could impose a degree of regulation-it did not hold broadcasters were agencies of
the U.S.-FCC has refrained from limiting them-That is what the 1st A[mendment] is all aboutthere is no government regulation here ...law requiring newspaper to take all or certain materials is
clearly unconstitutional-There is no restraint here over the broadcasters-The media are protected
by 1st Amendment, save for minor exceptions." Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes,
supra note 120.
127. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117.
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line and refuses to extend gov[emment] control
voices, he "draws the
28
broadcasting."
over
Justice Marshall voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit. He thought that
because, unlike newspapers, broadcasters paid nothing for use of the air
and could use it only under a license, there was a "government
aspect." 129 He believed that the First Amendment "protects controversial
talk." 130 For him, "Burton settled that use of the air is sufficient" to
invoke government action and the media's 3 refusal to carry
"controversial" items violated the First Amendment.1 1
Justice Blackmun voted to reverse. He reportedly said that "this is a
policy case-if [this] case is affirmed there will be a great flood of
constitutional decisions." He also believed that the Fairness Doctrine
32
had worked well and there was no violation of the First Amendment.
Justice Powell likewise voted to reverse. According to Justice
Blackmun's notes, Justice Powell found that "[g]overnment action is a
close question in totality," and noted that the airwaves belong to the
public. 133 Douglas's notes on Powell are similar: "not easy to find no
state action-FCC has not told media not to accept these ads-airways
interest."' 134
belong to public-private licensee is affected with a public
Justice Rehnquist also voted to reverse. However, his reasoning is
not entirely clear from the notes. Justice Blackmun's notes indicated that
Rehnquist "agrees with [White] as to government action," and "with
Licensees represent private parties during
[Stewart] as to its absence.
' 35
license."'
their
of
terms
3. Disagreements Over the State Action Question
The varying views of the Justices made reaching consensus on an
opinion difficult. The Justices' files reveal that Chief Justice Burger
made great efforts to convince the other Justices to join in his conclusion
that there was no state action.

128. Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 120.
129. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supranote 117.
130.

Id.

131. Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 120.
132. Id.
133. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117.
134. Justice Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 120.
135. Justice Blackmun's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 117. Douglas's notes
similarly indicated that Rehnquist "agrees with [White]-there is governmental action here-U.S.
controls by licensing and excluding others-license represent private not public interests." Justice
Douglas's Oct. 20, 1972 Conference Notes, supra note 120.
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The Chief Justice's First Draft

The Chief Justice's first draft of the opinion was circulated on
February 1, 1973.136 This draft generally presented the same arguments
in the same order as the published decision.
Justice Blackmun's clerk agreed with the Chief Justice's draft
137
except for Part III's conclusion that there was no governmental action.
While suggesting that the finding of no state action was intended to
"pull" Justice Stewart's vote, he noted that:
Legally, this Court has made a number of things "state action"
under the 14th A[mendment]. This case deals with the 1st
A[mendment], but the opinion does not suggest that "govemmental"
action is more difficult to show than "state" action or that the 1st
A[mendment] should be distinguished from the 14th A[mendment].
The policy difference, of course, is that the 14th A[mendment] cases
have been racial cases decided primarily before the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
If the Court is going to use the principles of those 14th
A[mendment] cases (and this circulation does that...) I do not feel
they support the result reached. The particularly difficult case is Burton
v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). From a purely
38
legal standpoint, I feel this part of Part III is weak.'
As a "matter of policy," he observed that the issue of state action
"may be far more important than the merits."' 139 He explained:
I feel the role of the Court under emerging doctrines (especially
privacy) is likely to carry the Court into more and more areas now
considered private.... I feel the Court is shifting more and more
toward protection of the individual from a crowded, technological
world. If that is one role of the Court (and I submit that the electronic
eavesdropping, environmental, and privacy cases 14
suggest that it is),
then this decision might get in the way in the future. 0

136. While this draft is not in Justice Blackmun's files, it was included in the papers of Justice
Brennan. PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
137. Memorandum from RIM [Ralph 1.Miller] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 3, 1972), in
PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library
of Congress). Miller commented that the Chief Justice's draft "brings a wealth of good writing and
sound thinking." Id. at 4. He noted that the organization did not clearly separate the statutory and
constitutional holdings, but dismissed that concern as a "matter of style." Id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 5-6.
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Miller concluded that it was not necessary to reach the state action
question because there were two "independent and adequate reasons" for
concluding that the First Amendment did not apply. First, as explained
in Part III of the draft, there was no governmental action. Second, as
explained in Part IV, access was not mandated by either the First
Amendment or the Communications Act. He recommended that Justice
Blackmun ask the Chief Justice to edit Part III, and if he was unwilling,
to draft a short opinion concurring in all but Part III and explaining that
he saw no reason to discuss governmental action. 141
Justice White seems to have had a similar reaction to the first draft.
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated February 9, 1973, he wrote,
"[b]ecause you reach and decide the First Amendment issue as a
statutory matter in Part IV, I do not see the reason for Part
III ....

Indeed, I thought the Court normally avoided constitutional

issues that were unnecessary to decision." 142 He added that in any event,
he did not agree with the conclusion that there was no government action
here.
The broadcasters make substantial claims that their conduct is either
authorized or required by the Fairness Doctrine, and your Part IV
seems to recognize that the Fairness Doctrine and other
Communications Act policies are greatly implicated in the challenged
broadcaster policy. I had thought that an otherwise private act ordered
or authorized by statute or other official
43 policy constitutes government
conduct for constitutional purposes.1
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, indicated in his letter to the
Chief Justice dated February 6, 1973, that he agreed with the result and
"portions of it, particularly
much of the proposed opinion, but noted,
' 144
concern."
considerable
me
cause
Part IV,

141.

Id.

142.

Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Feb. 9,

1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863

(Library of Congress).
143. Id.
144. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Feb. 6,
1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863

(Library of Congress).
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The Chief Justice's Response to Comments on His Draft

The Chief Justice responded to the comments on his draft opinion
with a Memorandum to the Conference dated February 14, 1973.145 He

observed that there seemed "to have been some confusion" about
whether Part IV was addressing statutory or constitutional issues. 146 He
offered to separately address the statutory and First Amendment issues,
but noted that "we cannot escape deciding whether the First Amendment
itself requires a right of access, unless we stop with a holding of no
governmental action. I cannot be persuaded that governmental
acquiescence147equals governmental action or that there is governmental
action here."'
Burger suggested the he could be persuaded by the lack of votes to
omit Part III. But then noted, "we would be obliged to say, of course,
that even assuming, arguendo, but without intimating an affirmative
view, that there is 'governmental action' present, nevertheless the [Court
of Appeals] is wrong on holding a First Amendment
right of access. To
1 48
me that is a cart-before-the-horse approach."
Burger added that he had "spent months in tearing [the government
action] issue apart, and [saw] in the Court of Appeals' holding a greater
threat to 'free press' than some others may acknowledge., 149 He
suggested that finding government acquiescence to be government
action would have had potentially broad implications with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the printed media. On both of these points,
he referred to Professor Jaffe's "thoughtful article" in the Harvard Law
50
Review. 1
In this Article, Jaffe argued that the "doctrines of fairness and
access do have some beneficial value in expanding the scope of pubic
debate on issues of importance. But the grounding and scope of these
doctrines is uncertain and if pressed too tendentiously their contribution
might be outweighed by their cost in other important values."1 51 In the
pages cited by the Chief Justice, Jaffe argued that the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in BEM "stretch[ed] the concept of state action," and should
145. Memorandum of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Feb. 14, 1973), in
PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library
of Congress) [hereinafter Chief Justice Burger's Feb. 14, 1974 Conference Memo].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Louis L. Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on
Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 782-87 (1972)).
151. Jaffe, supra note 150, at 768.
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52
have been based on statutory rather than constitutional grounds.1
Basing the decision on statutory grounds could have avoided "the
1 53
inevitable question whether printed publications are state action.
While he noted the "danger in one-newspaper towns that the press will
suppress local news for corrupt reasons," and thought it would be
"feasible to require newspapers to print advertorials and replies to
attacks on individuals," any broader effort to force newspapers to cover
newsworthy events or to do so fairly would "undermine such
independence as the press now shows without achieving any real
diversity."'' 54 Jaffe pointed out that it was difficult to distinguish
newspapers from broadcasting because there are more broadcast stations
than newspapers and over ninety-five percent of American cities lacked
competitive newspapers. 155
The Chief Justice's memorandum similarly suggested that it might
be difficult to distinguish broadcasting from print because the printed
media received governmental benefits in the form of subsidized mailing
rates and antitrust immunity. He did "not want to enlarge governmental
action concepts so as to embrace what government permits as
distinguished from what it commands."' 56 He concluded:

This case is crucial to the media, and I have approached it with a view
to giving broadcasters a posture as nearly as possible like that of a
private newspaper, consistent with the regulatory scheme. I do not
want broadcasters regulated more than they are 1now,
which would
57
surely be the result of a Court of Appeals' holding.

152. Id. at 784.
153. Id.
154.
155.

Id. at 784-85 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 670-71 (1970)).
Id. Jaffe discussed a "broader rationale" for finding state action put forth by commentators

including Barron and Nicholas Johnson. He noted: "[These commentators] subscribe to the
proposition that today-as distinguished from some never-identified halcyon age-great decisionmaking powers are lodged in the hands of a few who operate without defined legal responsibilities

or any formal duties of public accountability. Such great private power, it is reasoned, must be
brought under constitutional control." Id. at 785-86. "Jaffe strongly disagreed with this argument.
The implication that the people of this country-except for the proponents of this theory-are mere
unthinking automatons manipulated by the media, without interests, conflicts, or prejudices is an
assumption which I find quite maddening. The development of constitutional doctrine should not be
based on such hysterical overestimation of media power and underestimation of the good sense of
the American public." Id. at 787.
156. Chief Justice Burger's Feb. 14, 1974 Conference Memo, supra note 145.
157. Id.
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The next day, Justice Burger sent a handwritten note to Justice
Blackmun in an attempt to get Blackmun to support him on the state
action issue.
In all candor your Law Clerk's (RIM) memo is a surface job
trying to analyze what I've spentfour months on.
I suggest that the enclosed Jaffe article will afford some very
valuable background.

The "leopards" in law schools and courts are trying to lead people
down primrose path on the 14th Amend[ment]. Their wild eyed,
expansive view of "14" would open virtually all gov't decisions to
judicial review. This lad hasn't cut his "umbilical cord" to
158 the
professors yet! I know-that is what my boys tried to sell me on!
On February 21, 1973, the Chief Justice again implored Justice
Blackmun to support his view of the government action question. In a
"personal" letter to "Harry," he wrote: "I know you have not 'come to
rest' on the governmental action section of this case and the following
seems possibly useful for me to add-if I get four 'joiners' on that
section .
,,59 What followed was a long quote from the Jaffe article
critiquing Judge Wright's argument that broadcasting is state action
because it is regulated. It made the point that broadcasting is not a public
utility and added:
Furthermore, we are all regulated in thousands of ways in our use of
our houses and our streets. We are all inextricably and intimately
dependent upon and interdependent with government. Yet because we
believe it to be important to distinguish the private and public spheres,
our acts, our failures to act, our prejudices, and our misconducts do not
become acts of government. If we discriminate, indeed, if we are
permitted to discriminate, against blacks, government has not therefore
discriminated.... By merely tolerating my action the state does not
160
adopt it as its own ....

Burger concluded that if this approach gave Blackmun "any
'comfort' he would "try out on the Brethren." A handwritten postscript

158. Personal Note from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb.
15, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71863 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Chief Justice Burger, Personal Note].
159. Personal Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun (Feb. 21, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY.A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999,
Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Chief Justice Burger, Personal
Memorandum].
160. Id.
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is for reading in your 'vast leisure'-but please don't wait
added: "This
16 1
that long!",

On March 8, 1973, Justice Stewart wrote to the Chief Justice in
reply to his February 14 memo. Stewart noted his agreement that they
"must deal with both constitutional and statutory issues, because the
petitioners cannot prevail unless the respondents are wrong on both
issues. I am convinced the respondents are wrong on both issues.' 62 He
argued that the decision of a broadcast station was not a government
decision and because there was no governmental action, the Constitution
of state action so clear that he
was not implicated. He thought that lack
163
was unwilling to assume it arguendo.
By the end of March, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell had
still not responded to the Chief Justice's February 14 memo. The Chief
Justice sent another memo to those three, suggesting yet another reason
for finding no state action. He argued that finding broadcaster action to
be government action would create new problems under the
Establishment Clause. He asked: "1. Can 'government action' be
permitted to sponsor church service programs on radio and TV? 2. Can
for the Speech Clause but
we say broadcaster action is 'governmental'
64
not for the Establishment Clause?"'
c.

The Chief Justice's Second Draft

65
On April 9, 1973, the Chief Justice circulated a revised draft.
This draft made a number of changes, particularly in Part IV. The first
draft of Part IV started out observing that the lack of governmental
action normally obviated the need to consider constitutional claims.
Here, however:

Congress expressly wrote First Amendment values into the
Communications Act, and... DNC urges that a licensee's refusal to
161. Id.
162. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Mar. 8,
1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863
(Library of Congress).
163. Id. Stewart adds that if the FCC were to impose an access scheme as suggested by
respondents, broadcasters would have a serious First Amendment claim. He concludes with the
observation that perhaps his thinking is "unduly influenced by Hugo Black," but he is "instinctively
leery of talk about 'First Amendment values' or of the 'values' of any other provisions of the
Constitution." Id.
164. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry
A. Blackmun, and Lewis Powell (Mar. 29, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme
Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress).
165. PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
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accept editorial ads violates the "public interest" standard of the Act.
We therefore go on to consider whether the statute, including the First
Amendment principles embodied in the Act, requires a licensee to
grant the right of access claimed by respondents.'16
In contrast, the second draft of Part IV does not address the First
Amendment, and only considers "respondents' claim that the 'public
interest' standard of the Communications Act requires broadcasters to
accept editorial advertisements."' 167 The second draft also adds a footnote
in Part III that
cites Jaffe's article critiquing the D.C. Circuit's finding of
168
state action.
In a memo to Justice Blackmun summarizing the Chief Justice's
April 9 draft, Miller stated that nothing in the Jaffe article changed his
opinion on the state action issue.1 6 9 He explained that while Jaffe
rejected finding state action merely because broadcasting was regulated
or powerful, he failed to address whether the use of state property and
state monopoly constituted state action. Further, Miller noted that Jaffe
believed that the D.C. Circuit had reached the correct result, and had
urged affirmance on narrow grounds. Miller commented
that
170
"Obviously, the Chief is not interested in that part of the article."'
Miller concluded:
I think the 1st A[mendment] substantive issue ("does the. 1st
A[mendment] mandate a right of access") is implicit in the "public
interest" statutory issue. The statutory issue must be considered, and I
see no reason not to consider the 1st A[mendment] claim. If the 1st
A[mendment] claim is rejected on the71 merits, it is then unnecessary to
reach the difficult state-action issue.]
He recommended that Justice Blackmun join Part IV alone or issue
a short concurrence (or join with White or Powell). 172 A handwritten
"agree" in the margin denotes Justice Blackmun's agreement with this
approach.

73

166. 1st Draft Opinion, in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71-863 to 71866 (Library of Congress).
167. 2d Draft Opinion, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., at 26 (Feb. 10,
1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, No. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
168. Id. at 19 n.15.
169. Circulation Memorandum from RIM [Ralph I. Miller] to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
(Apr. 10, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157,
No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter RIM, Circulation Memorandum].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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On April 16, 1973, Justice Blackmun wrote to the Chief Justice that
"[a]fter careful study" of the April 9 draft and the Jaffe article,
[His] present inclination is to join the judgment of the Court and your
opinion except for Part III and such other portions as may bear on the
question of governmental action. It seems to me that the First
Amendment issue is implicit in the public interest statutory issue
which, in any event, must be resolved. When we reject the implicitly
included First Amendment claim on the merits, as you do in Part IV,
then it seems to me to174 be unnecessary to reach the difficult
governmental action issue.
He added that he was not opposed to Part III remaining in the
opinion, but preferred to defer deciding the state action issue to another
time. 17 5 On the same date, Justice White told the Chief Justice that he
was still having difficulties with Part 111.176 And a few days later, Justice
Powell notified both the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun that even
after further study of the Jaffe article and other authorities, he continued
to have doubts on the
government action issue and did not think it
77
necessary to decide. 1
d.

The Third Draft and Published Opinion

The Chief Justice circulated a third draft of his opinion on May 23,
1973. A memo from the Chief Justice later that same day notes that he
"had intended to send a cover letter calling attention to a substantive
change in Part IV. The change restores the first draft approach of dealing
with both the statutory claims [and] the First Amendment claim in Part
IV. In the second draft Part IV was not an explicit First Amendment

174. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Apr.
16, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71863 (Library of Congress).
175. Id.
176. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Apr. 16,
1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863
(Library of Congress).
177. Memorandum from Justice Lewis Powell to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice
Harry Blackmun (Apr. 19, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 19181999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress).
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treatment as it is now."' 178 He added that this section will likely get five
votes. 179
The third draft does not differ significantly from the published
version. Only some of the arguments that Burger made in trying to get
the other Justices to join this part of the opinion were included in the
published opinion.
The published opinion described the question of state action as
novel and noted that the lower court held that broadcasters were state
actors because they were "granted use of part of the public domain and
are regulated as 'proxies' or 'fiduciaries' of the people."'' 80 Itthen
observed that while these "characterizations are not without validity...
they do not resolve the sensitive constitutional issues inherent in
deciding whether a particular licensee action is subject to First
Amendment restraints. ' 1 It asserted that "the line between private
conduct and governmental action cannot be defined by reference to any
general formula unrelated to particular exercises of governmental
authority."' 182 This was followed by a history of the development of
broadcasting regulation. It described the regulatory scheme as one in
which "the Commission acts in essence as an 'overseer,' but the initial
and primary responsibility for fairness, balance, and objectivity rests
with the licensee."'183 The opinion pointed out that "the Commission has
not fostered the licensee policy challenged here; it has simply declined
to command particular action because it fell within the area of
that the government was
journalistic discretion."'184 Thus, it concluded
85
not a partner to the broadcaster's action.
The opinion also noted that if it were to find state action,
few licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the processes of
editorial evaluation would escape constitutional scrutiny. In this
sensitive area so sweeping a concept of governmental action would go
far in practical effect to undermine nearly a half century of
178. Memorandum from the Chief Justice to the Conference (May 23, 1973), in PAPERS OF
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, No. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
179. On May 22, 1973, the Chief Justice also wrote to Justice Brennan to advise him of the
change in Part IV since it could affect his dissent. PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, Nos.
71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
180. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 115 (1973) (quoting
Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 117.
184. Id. at 118.

185. Id. at 119. The opinion contrasts this conclusion to such cases as Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), and Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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unmistakable congressional purpose to maintain-no matter how
difficult the task-essentially private broadcastyjournalism held only
broadly accountable to public interest standards.
This part of the opinion reflects the Chief Justice's concern
expressed in his February 14 memo that upholding the lower court's
decision would pose a threat to free press. However, the opinion does
not reflect his concerns outside of broadcasting. For example, it does not
reflect the view expressed in his handwritten note to Justice Blackmun
that adopting the lower court's view of state action "would open
virtually all gov't decisions to judicial review."' 87 It does not make the
point suggested by the quote from Jaffe in the February 21 letter to
Justice Blackmun that a finding of state action would prohibit private
acts of discrimination by individuals.' 88 Nor does it mention potential
problems under the Establishment Clause cited in the March 29 memo to
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. 189 It is impossible to tell, of
course, whether the Chief Justice was just trying out different arguments
to see if he could get the votes needed for a majority, or whether these
concerns, actually motivated his decision, even though they are not
discussed in the opinion.
4. Concurring Opinions of Justices Blackmun and White
The differing views on the question of state action prompted Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, and Justice White to issue separate
concurring opinions. The files shed some light on why the three Justices
did not join in a single concurring opinion.
On April 10, 1973, Miller reported that Justice White had circulated
a note stating that he would avoid the state action issue and resolve the
case on statutory and substantive First Amendment grounds, the same
approach that Miller had recommended. He offered to find out if Justice
White planned to write a concurrence, and if not, he suggested that
Justice Blackmun might do so. 190

On April 16, 1973, Miller wrote Justice Blackmun that he had
called Justice White's clerk, Bob Barnett, to get clarification on whether
Justice White would draft a concurring opinion. Barnett was unsure
186. Id. at 120.
187. Chief Justice Burger, Personal Note, supra note 158.
188. See Chief Justice Burger, Personal Memorandum, supra note 159.
189. See Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justices Thurgood Marshall,
Harry A. Blackmun, and Lewis Powell (Mar. 29, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN,
Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress).
190. RIM, Circulation Memorandum, supra note 169.
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whether Justice White would write a concurring opinion, but he thought
that Justice White thought the Chief Justice was "simply wrong on state
action." 19 1 Miller suggested that the better course was to assert that the
seemed to
question need not be reached and Barnett agreed. Barnett
192
approach.
that
to
open
be
might
White
Justice
think that
This same memo praised Justice Blackmun's note to the Chief
Justice, in which Blackmun argued it was unnecessary to reach the
government action issue.19 3 But he added that if Justice Blackmun sent
the note only to the Chief Justice, it would not encourage Justice White.
Thus, he recommended that Justice Blackmun circulate a note to the
conference indicating his concerns about Part III and suggested that 1he
94
find out whether Justice White planned to write a concurring opinion.
Two days later, on April 18, 1973, Justice Blackmun circulated the first
draft of5 his concurrence. The next day, Justice White circulated his first
draft.

19

Miller's analysis of the two drafts concluded that Justice
Blackmun's position differed from Justice White's in two ways. First,
the "most obvious difference is .that [Justice Blackman] remain[ed] on
neutral ground on the governmental action issue. Justice White initially
expressed strong feelings that governmental action was present
(February 9 note) but he has now changed that to say he is 'not ready to
conclude' there is no governmental action. 1 96 Interestingly, despite
Miller's assertion that Blackmun had consistently taken a neutral
position on the question of state action, Miller's bench memo strongly

191. Memorandum from RIM [Ralph I. Miller] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr. 16, 1973),
in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863
(Library of Congress).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. The circulation of two similar concurring opinions seems to have precipitated some
concern that Justice Blackmun could be accused of violating Court etiquette. In a memo dated May
17, 1973, Miller set out a detailed chronology of events regarding the two concurrences that he
constructed from the files and his memory. See Memorandum from RIM [Ralph I. Miller] to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun (May 17, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter RIM, May 17, 1973 Memo].
He concluded that Justice Blackmun "cannot be accused of stealing ideas from Justice White.
Justice White was having trouble getting his ducks in a row." Id. He pointed out that Justice
Blackmun's position had "consistently been that 'the governmental action issue does not affect the
outcome' so you 'refrain from deciding it."' Id. In contrast, Justice White's position, as evidenced in
the correspondence, had vacillated. RIM added, "I am not clear on the private conversation you had
with him. The objective indicia indicate that you wrote when Justice White had abandoned his
former position and had not taken a new stand. I do not feel there was any breach of courtesy." Id.
196. Id.
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argued for finding state action and Blackmun's own memo seemed to
agree. 197
A second difference, according to Miller, was that Justice
Blackmun had reasoned that "any affirmative duties imposed by the 1st
A[mendment] would be read into the [Communications] Act. Since the
Court finds that the [Communications] Act imposes no affirmative duty
of the type imposed by [the D.C. Circuit], a fortiori the 1st A[mendment]
imposes no such duty."' 98 In contrast, Miller noted:
Justice White hints that the 1st A[mendment] does impose obligations
and, but for the Fairness Doctrine, the Court might need to step in. He
feels the Fairness Doctrine cures those defects. His position goes much
further than yours because he seems to conclude that the 1st
A[mendment] imposes the Fairness Doctrine. That is a step beyond
Red Lion, and I suspect you would need a substantial amount of
consideration before taking that step.199
200
Thus, Miller recommended that Justice Blackmun "stand fast.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence went through four drafts. The draft
was cut from two paragraphs to one between the third and fourth drafts.
It appears that this change was made in response to the third (and final
draft) circulated by the Chief Justice on May 23, 1973. The clerks for
Justices Blackmun and Powell agreed that since the "Court has now
decided the constitutional issue," the concurrence no longer needed to
link the constitutional issue to the statutory issue.20 ' Miller suggested
two options for modifying the concurrence and Blackmun incorporated
the first option into the fourth draft, which is identical to the published
version. It read:

In Part IV the Court determines "whether, assuming governmental
action, broadcasters are required" to accept editorial advertisements
"by reason of the First Amendment." The Court concludes that the
Court of Appeals erred when it froze the "continuing search for means
to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment
rights of the public and the licensees" into "a constitutional holding."
The Court's conclusion that the First Amendment does not compel the
result reached by the Court of Appeals demonstrates that the
197. See supra notes 103-04, 117, and accompanying text.
198. RIM, May 17, 1973 Memo, supra note 195.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Memorandum from RIM [Ralph 1. Miller] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (May 24, 1973),
in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863
(Library of Congress).
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affect the outcome of this case. I
governmental action issue does not
it. 202
deciding
from
refrain
therefore
In contrast, Justice White's concurring opinion was three
paragraphs long and contained no substantive changes from his first
draft dated April 19, 1973. He found that "it is at least arguable, and
strongly so, that the Communications Act and the policies of the
Commission, including the Fairness Doctrine, are here sufficiently
implicated to require review of the Commission's orders under the First
Amendment." 20 3 But he did not think that deciding the state action
question was necessary to reverse the-lower court because:
[A]ssuming, arguendo.... that Congress or the Commission is
sufficiently involved in the denial of access to the broadcasting media
to require review under the First Amendment, I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Given the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine, and accepting Part IV of the Court's opinion, I have.
little difficulty in concluding that statutory and regulatory recognition
of broadcaster freedom and discretion to make up their own programs
with the Fairness Doctrine is
and to choose their method of compliance
2 4
consistent with the First Amendment. 0
Thus, while Blackmun and White agreed that assuming government
action, the First Amendment did not compel broadcasters to accept
editorial advertisements, White strongly suggested that there was
government action while Blackmun and Powell indicated no views on
the question. The Justices' papers suggest however, that at least at one
20 5
It
time, Blackmun and Powell thought there probably was state action.
is unclear why Blackmun wrote his concurring opinion taking no
position. He may have been persuaded by the Chief Justice's entreaties
20 6
He may have
that finding state action would set a bad precedent.
simply thought it did not matter because finding state action would not
have altered the outcome of this case. Yet, had Blackmun and Powell
202. 4th Draft Concurrence of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., at 2 (recirculated May 14, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN,
Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) (internal citations
omitted).
203. Compare 1st Draft Concurrence of Justice Byron R. White, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm. (circulated Apr. 19, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme
Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress) with Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 146 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
204. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 147. See supra notes 127, 143-44, and
accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 127, 142-43, and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part 1I.C.3.
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found state action instead of merely assuming it for purposes of
argument, there would have been a majority for this finding, and a
holding that broadcasters' editorial decisions constituted state action
could have had substantial consequences. °7
5. Concurring Opinions by Justices Stewart and Douglas
The separate concurring opinions by Justices Douglas and Stewart
agreed with the Chief Justice that there was no state action, but went
further to argue that upholding the D.C. Circuit's decision would violate
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.
a. Justice Douglas's Early Drafts
Justice Douglas originally voted to uphold the D.C. Circuit's
decision and planned to dissent.20 8 Over the course of eighteen drafts,
however, his opinion changed from a dissent to a concurring opinion. It
also became increasingly strident in its disapproval of Red Lion and of
treating broadcasters any differently than newspapers under the First
Amendment.

207. See, e.g., Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 159 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to
determine whether the petitioners' exclusion by the broadcasters constituted governmental action
for First Amendment purposes); Belluso v. Turner Commc'ns Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 398-99, 401
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting disagreement over the governmental action issue in CBS and declining to
hold the action of the broadcaster in denying the plaintiff airtime was governmental action open to
challenge under the First Amendment); Kuczo v. W. Conn. Broad. Co., 566 F.2d 384, 387-88 (2d
Cir. 1977) (same); Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (same).
208. In a memorandum to Justice Brennan in October 1972, shortly after the conference,
Justice Douglas said he was willing to let Justice Brennan undertake drafting the dissent in CBS.
Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice William Brennan (Oct. 25, 1972), in
PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library
of Congress). Yet, on February 4, 1973, Douglas's memorandum to the conference indicates that he
planned to write his own dissent. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Conference
(Feb. 4, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No.
71-863 (Library of Congress). And on February 10, 1973, Justice Douglas sent a note to the Chief
Justice saying he had hoped to have his dissent ready by February 12, 1973, but would not be able
to do so. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Feb.
10, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71863 (Library of Congress).
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Justice Douglas's first draft is dated January 12, 1973.209 This draft,
as well as drafts two through eight, were not circulated to the other
Justices. The first draft indicated that Justice Douglas, like dissenting
FCC Commissioner Johnson, was troubled by the greater protection
afforded commercial speech than political speech. Douglas observed that
in Valentine v. Chrestensen,210 the Court held that business
advertisements did not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment,
while New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 11 held that editorial advertising
212
was protected by the First Amendment.
It comes therefore as a surprise that business and commercial matters,
which are not protected by the First Amendment, can use the mass
media for a fee but those who want to discuss public issues or do
editorial advertising may not do so, even though they tender
2 13 the same
fee that would purchase time for a manufacturer or retailer.
This draft identified the central issue as whether the FCC may
discriminate in favor of paid commercial broadcasts against paid
broadcasts of political and other issues. It recognized that the problem
was complicated because only a limited amount of spectrum was
available, the spectrum was part of public domain, broadcast channels
were the most important instrument for the exercise of First Amendment
2 14
rights, and the First Amendment prohibited censorship of broadcasts.
Citing Red Lion, the draft concluded that "the people.., must of
necessity establish some ground rules for its use. 215 However,
"[e]xperience has shown that power cannot be trusted to serve the public
weal even though it be in government hands."'2 16 Thus, "[w]hile some
regulation of the spectrum owned by the people is necessary,... the

209. Justice Douglas's papers at the Library of Congress contained printed copies of all
eighteen drafts. 1st Draft (Jan. 8, 1973); 2d Draft (Jan. 12, 1973); 3d Draft (Jan. 17, 1973); 4th Draft
(Feb. 9, 1973); 5th Draft (Feb. 10, 1973); 6th Draft (Feb. 27, 1973); 7th Draft (Feb. 28, 1973); 8th
Draft (Mar. 21, 1973); 9th Draft (Mar. 27, 1973); 10th Draft (Mar. 30, 1973); 1 1th Draft (Apr. 23,
1973); 12th Draft (Apr. 24, 1973); 13th Draft (Apr. 30, 1973); 14th Draft (May 15, 1973); 15th
Draft (May 17, 1973); 16th Draft (May 18, 1973); 17th Draft (May 22, 1973); and 18th Draft (May
23, 1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Boxes 1597 & 1598, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866

(Library of Congress). In addition, the files also contained printed copies that were marked up by
hand to indicate changes to be made in the next draft. Such drafts are designated with both the old
and new number (e.g., 9th/IOth draft).
210.
211.

316 U.S. 52 (1942).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Justice Douglas's 1st Draft, supra note 209, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at4.
Id. at 5.
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217
First Amendment cautions that that regulation be the very minimum.,
The draft then discussed the equal time provisions of section 315 and the
2 18
Fairness Doctrine, "which this Court approved in the Red Lion case.,
Returning to the issue in this case, the draft observed: "The issue is
between paid-for political controversial speech and paid-for
noncontroversial (or not so controversial) commercial speech. If the
latter is not protected by the First Amendment, I see no possible grounds
for allowing it a preferred position. 219 Moreover, even if commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment, Justice Douglas noted:

Where two competing First Amendment rights are treated differently
by government, there must be "compelling interests" that justify the
discrimination ....

We may not say that all controversial speech can

be excluded from the mass media for that would be censorship of an
especially ominous kind. It would cast the die with the status quo and
only increase the amount of mass media garbage that we already
collect.22 °
Thus, Douglas agreed with the lower court that "the First
Amendment does not permit discrimination against paid editorial
comment in favor of paid commercial speech.",22 1 At the same time, he
believed that the First Amendment did not give the right to speak only to
those who could pay. He emphasized the narrowness of the issue, that is,
whether the FCC may constitutionally approve a flat ban on paid
editorials, and thought that the lower
court properly remanded the case
222
to the FCC to develop guidelines.
The first draft concluded with this paragraph:
I did not participate in Red Lion and I would not extend its dynasty.
The guidelines I would ask the Commission to prepare would relate to
the access of television and radio to all groups and interests and set it
to work out the orderly process for making the channels available to all
parts of the spectrum.
In the second draft, Douglas omitted the sentence about not
extending the Red Lion dynasty. He added two paragraphs to the end of
the decision emphasizing that the broadcast media are entitled to the

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.at5.
Id. at6.
Id. at7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 10.
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government's role
same freedoms as the print media and that the2 2federal
4
is limited to providing for orderly procedures.
In the third draft, he again registered his discomfort with Red Lion,
this time in a footnote:
While I did not participate in the Red Lion decision, I have been
dubious about its result for the reason that the monetary and other
burdens imposed by the right of reply, like the traditional damage
remedy for libel, lead to the self-censorship respecting matters of
importance to the public that the First Amendment denies the
government the power to impose. The burdens certainly are as onerous
as the indirect restrictions on First Amendment right which we have
225
struck down ....
b.

Justice Douglas's Fourth Through Ninth Drafts

Douglas's fourth draft, dated February 9, 1973, differed
significantly from the first three drafts. The entire first section, which
discussed how the FCC discriminated against paid political speech in
favor of paid commercial speech, was deleted. Instead, the fourth draft
began: "If, as the Court holds, a broadcast license is not engaged in
governmental action for purposes of the First Amendment, I fail to see
how constitutionally we can treat TV and the radio differently than we
treat newspapers. ,,226 It continued:
It would come as a surprise to the public as well as to publishers and
editors of newspapers to be informed that a newly created federal
bureau would hereafter provide "guidelines" for newspapers or
promulgate rules that would give a federal agency power to ride herd
to make sure that fair comment on all
on the publishing business
227
current issues was made.
This change in approach was undoubtedly made in response to the Chief
Justice's first draft, which circulated on February 1, 1973, and found in
Part III that there was no state action.

224. Justice Douglas's 2d Draft, supranote 209, at 10-11.
225. Justice Douglas's 3d Draft, supranote 209, at 11, n.8.
226. Justice Douglas's 4th Draft, supra note 209, at 1.
227. Id. at 1-2. In response to the argument made by advocates of public access that broadcast
stations have become too powerful and exert such an influence that they must be controlled by
government, Douglas noted that "even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base and obnoxious the
press could be, never dreamed of interfering. For he thought that government control of newspapers
would be the greater of two evils." Id. at 2.
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The fourth draft also contained a stronger rejection of Red Lion. In
place of the footnote stating that he was "dubious about its result," he
wrote in the text that Red Lion, "in a carefully written opinion that was
built upon predecessor cases put the TV and the radio under a different
regime. I did not participate in that decision and, with all respect, would
''228
not support it.
He expressed concern that if a broadcast licensee was

a government agency for First Amendment purposes, "[a]dministration
after administration
could toy with it to serve its sordid or its benevolent
229
ends."
Justice Douglas acknowledged claims that the broadcast media
were too slanted in their coverage of politics, but observed that the same
concerns were raised against newspapers and magazines during the
McCarthy era. Yet, even then, there was "no reason to put the saddle of
the federal bureaucracy on the backs of publishers. Under our Bill of
Rights people are entitled to have extreme ideas, silly ideas, partisan
ideas.,

230

He added, "[t]he same is true, I believe, of the TV and

231

radio.
Douglas went on to observe that the First Amendment was written
in absolute terms and could only be changed by constitutional
amendment. While the licensing of broadcast stations was necessary for
engineering reasons to avoid interference, censorship was not. He
criticized the Court's decision:
[The

decision]

sanctions

a

federal

saddle

on

broadcast

licensees ....[T]he regime of federal supervision approved today is

contrary to our constitutional mandate and makes the broadcast
licensee an easy victim of political pressures and reduces him to a
timid and submissive segment of the press whose measure of the
public interest will now be echoes
of the dominant political voice that
232
emerges after every election.
Justice Douglas made numerous additions in the next several drafts.
The fifth draft included examples of how inroads had been made on the
freedom of newspapers.233 The seventh draft acknowledged that FCC
Commissioner Johnson had written a "powerful dissent," but found that
"the prospect of putting government in a Position of control over

228. Id. at 3.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.

232. Id. at 5-6.
233. Justice Douglas's 5th Draft, supra note 209, at 6-8.
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[was] an appalling one, even to the extent that Red Lion
publishers
4
went.

23

The eighth draft added a new beginning section that discussed
Congress's authorization of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
("CPB") and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Douglas observed
that although CPB is said not to be a government agency, it is difficult to
see why not. He added that if the government owned a newspaper, it
would not be free to pick and choose news items as it desired because
government may not censor or enact any law abridging freedom of
press. 235 By this logic, a public broadcasting station could not turn down
programs tendered by respondents in the present case.236
The ninth draft quoted National Broadcasting Co. v. United States
for the point that "radio inherently is not available to all," but went on to
observe that "the press in a realistic sense is likewise not available to
all."237 This draft also cited Emerson's The System of Freedom of
Expression as making a "powerful argument" for "revamping or
reconditioning" the First Amendment, but concluded:
What kind of First Amendment would best serve our needs as we
approach the 21st century may be an open question. But the old
fashioned First Amendment that we have is the Court's only guideline;
and one hard and fast principle which it announces is that government
shall keep its hands off the press.238
c.

Justice Douglas's Later Drafts

The ninth draft, dated March 27, 1973, was the first to be circulated
to the other Justices. It was labeled as a dissent. 9
The next day, the Chief Justice sent a personal note to Justice
Douglas:

234.

Justice Douglas's 7th Draft, supra note 209, at 7-8.

235.

Justice Douglas's 8th Draft, supra note 209, at 1-2.

236.
237.

Id.
Justice Douglas's 9th Draft, supra note 209, at 8 (quoting Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United

States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943)).

238. Id. at 9.
239. On the same date, Justice Douglas's clerk suggested that the opinion should be labeled as
a concurrence because "[t]he Court reverses the [Court of Appeals], which had held that the FCC
must promulgate regulations regarding the right of access. Thus, the Court rejects the notion that
Red Lion approves a comprehensive scheme of regulation. As long as broadcasters hold to overall
'fairness,' the Court says, they are free to do what they want." Memorandum from PMK to Justice
William 0. Douglas (Mar. 27, 1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71-863
to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
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As I read your draft dissent I suggest you misread my opinion. Far
from "saddling" broadcasters with anything (your page 11), I propose
to remove the saddle the [Court of Appeals] put on them concerning
"editorial ads."
The net of your treatment really seems to me to constitute a
concurrence in at least Part IV and in the result I reach.
What have I missed?

240

The following day, Justice Douglas wrote back to the Chief Justice:
"[Y]ou are quite right. My opinion is not a dissent. I concur in the
judgment of reversal and will circulate a new draft.",24 1 Also dated
March 29 is a note to Justice Douglas from his clerk: "I believe that you
do concur in the result because you would reverse the decision of the
[Court of Appeals]. However, I would be reluctant to join any part of the
[Chief Justice's] opinion [because] he endorses so heavily Red Lion and
does not preclude censorship in the future. 242 Thus, Douglas added a
new first sentence to the tenth draft: "While I join the Court in reversing
' 243
the judgment below, I do so for quite different reasons.
240. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice William 0. Douglas, Re:
Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 (Mar. 28, 1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
241. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Mar.
29, 1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of
Congress).
242. Memorandum from PMK to Justice William 0. Douglas (Mar. 29, 1973), in PAPERS OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Box 1597, Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress). He adds: "As to
his charge that you misread his opinion, it probably is that he misreads yours." Id. He suggests that
there is some ambiguity in the third full paragraph on page eleven that could be clarified with a
sentence he suggested. It is not clear exactly what the clerk suggested in the way of change, but the
first sentence of that paragraph was altered by adding a side notation that would have the sentence
read:
The Court in today's decision by endorsing the FairnessDoctrine sanctions a federal
saddle on broadcast licensees that is agreeable to the traditions of nations that never have
known freedom of press and that is tolerable in countries that do not have a written
constitution containing prohibitions as absolute as those in the First Amendment.
Justice Douglas's 9th/I0th Draft, supra note 209, at II (proposed change denoted in italics). Cf
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
243. Justice Douglas's 10th Draft, supra note 209, at 1.This is also the first sentence of the
published version. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 148. In the published version of Justice
Douglas's opinion, this passage remains but the last sentence has been changed to "[t]he Court does
not, however, decide whether a broadcast licensee is a federal agency within the context of these
cases." Id. at 150.
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The tenth draft also responded to Justice Brennan's dissent, which
had been circulated on March 28, 1973. Douglas wrote:
If a TV or radio licensee were a federal agency, the thesis of my
Brother Brennan would inexorably follow. For a licensee of the federal
government would be in precisely the situation of the Public
Broadcasting Corp. A licensee, like an agency of the government,
would within limits of its time be bound to disseminate all views. For
being an arm of the government it would be unable by reason of the
First Amendment to "abridge" some sectors of thought in favor of
others. But since the licensee is not by the ruling of the Court an
the government, the posture of these cases is radically
agency of
244
changed.

The tenth draft also added language regarding Red Lion: "The
Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime. It puts
the head of the camel inside the tent and enables administration after
administration to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its
benevolent ends. 245
In subsequent drafts, Justice Douglas added quotations 246 and
examples, 247 but did not make substantial changes to the structure or
arguments set forth in the tenth draft. He added a footnote to the
fifteenth draft observing that "[s]carcity may soon be a constraint of the
past, thus obviating the concerns expressed in Red Lion. It has been
predicted that it may be possible within 10 years to provide television
viewers 400 channels through the advances of cable television., 248 In the
eighteenth draft, he added a new opening paragraph strongly stating his
conclusion "that the TV and radio stand in the same protected position
under the First Amendment as the newspapers and magazines. 49

244. Justice Douglas's 1Oth Draft, supra note 209, at 3.
245. Id. at 4-5.
246. For example, the I lth/12th Draft, April 23, 1973, adds a quote from Jaffe's article in the
Harvard Law Review in the third footnote. Justice Douglas's I lth/12th Draft Concurrence, supra
note 209, at Rider 4. The 14th/15th Draft, adds a long quote from Harry Kalven, Jr. about the use of
self-help. Justice Douglas's l4th/I5th Draft, supra note 209, at 7-8.
247. For example, the I lth/12th Draft cites a bill introduced by Congressman Farbstein in
1970 to impose Fairness Doctrine-type requirements on monopoly newspapers as an example of
2th
how government will try to extend broadcast regulation to newspapers. Justice Douglas's II th/1
Draft, supra note 209, at Rider 3.
248. Justice Douglas's 14th/15th Draft, supra note 209, at Rider 10 (adding footnote 8)
(citations omitted). This footnote has been frequently cited since by those advocating that Red Lion
be overturned. See, e.g., Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Tribune Co. v. FCC, 545 U.S.
1123 (2005) (No. 04-1036).
249. Justice Douglas's 18th Draft, supra note 209, at 1.
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Thus, as it progressed through multiple drafts, Justice Douglas's
opinion changed from a dissent to a concurrence. Initially, he took the
position that discrimination in favor of commercial speech, which was
not protected by the First Amendment, over political speech, which was
protected by the First Amendment, was unsupportable. Douglas
abandoned this position, however, after the Chief Justice circulated a
draft opinion concluding that there was no state action. But when it
became clear that the Chief Justice lacked a majority for this finding,
Justice Douglas did not revert to his original position. Instead, he
expanded upon his view that there was no basis for treating broadcasters
differently than newspapers, and thus any regulation of broadcasting was
contrary to our constitutional scheme.
Douglas's concurring opinion has been frequently cited over the
past thirty-five years by parties opposed to public access or seeking to
overturn Red Lion. Indeed, in Miami Herald, the amicus brief of the
Radio Television News Directors Association included a page-long
quote of Justice Douglas's concurrence in support of its argument that
the Court should reject the effort to extend the fairness rationale to
newspapers because leading jurists as well as FCC officials were
questioning the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine.2 5 ° The
National Association of Broadcasters' amicus brief quoted Douglas's
assertion that the "Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First
Amendment regime" in urging the Court to avoid relying on Red Lion.25'
d.

Justice Stewart's Draft Opinions

By the time Justice Stewart circulated the first draft of his
concurring opinion on May 10, 1972, Justice Douglas had circulated his
fifteenth draft. Justice Stewart's first draft opened by expressing his
general agreement with Justice Douglas: "While I join Parts I, II, and III

250. Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 5-7, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797).

251.

Brief for National Ass'n of Broadcasters as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11,

Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797). The FCC itself cited
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in its decision repealing the Fairness Doctrine. Syracuse Peace

Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5069 n.207 (1987). More recently, a party asking the Court to overrule
the Third Circuit's decision in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,upholding the constitutionality of
ownership limits, quoted Douglas's observation that "[s]carcity may soon be a constraint of the past,
thus obviating Red Lion," in urging the Court to "jettison the scarcity doctrine." Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Media General, Inc. v. FCC, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005) (No. 04-1020).
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of the Court's opinion, my views closely approach those expressed by
Mr. Justice Douglas in concurrence. 52
Justice Stewart circulated a second draft on May 14, 1972, and a
third draft on May 16, 1972. In addition, on May 25, 1972, he circulated
revisions in "light of Harry Blackmun's revised concurring opinion. 2 53
There were no major changes between the first draft and the published
version. While Justice Stewart indicated that his views were close to
those of Justice Douglas, he was not so stridently opposed to Red
Lion.254

Much of Justice Stewart's concurrence was devoted to explaining
why he disagreed with other dissenting or concurring Justices. In so
doing, he seems to have generated complaints that he mischaracterized
their positions. Justice Blackmun's clerk, for example, alerted Justice
Blackmun that Justice .Stewart had erroneously described Justice
Blackmun's concurrence as taking the position that the "public interest"
standard of the255Communications Act and the First Amendment were
"coextensive.,
The clerk called this "an unacceptable attempt to get
around your solid position," and recommended that the Justice "parry
this ill-conceived thrust" by adding a sentence to his concurrence.2 56
Justice Brennan's copy of Justice Stewart's first draft had several
handwritten notations to the effect that Brennan never said the things
attributed to him by Justice Stewart. For example, Stewart wrote that
[H]ere the Court of Appeals held, and the dissenters today agree, that
the First Amendment requires the Government to impose controls
upon private broadcasters-in order to preserve First Amendment
252. The wording in the published opinion is slightly different, in that "in concurrence" has
been changed to "concurring in the judgment." Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
253. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to the Conference (May 25, 1973), in PAPERS
OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, No. 71-863 to 71-866 (Library of Congress). All of these
documents may be found in PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, No. 71-863 to 71-866
(Library of Congress).
254. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
255. Memorandum from RIM [Ralph I. Miller] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Justice
Stewart; 1st Draft; May 10 (May 10, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court
File, 1918-1999, Box 157, No. 71-863 (Library of Congress).
256. Id. The cover note to Miller's memo suggests that he found "Justice Stewart's conduct
mildly offensive," and that Justice Blackmun might wish to "take this out of turn." Id. The
suggested addition read: "Although the Communications Act and the First Amendment are certainly
not 'coextensive,' the type of affirmative duty imposed by the Court of Appeals would necessarily
be implicit in the Communications Act if it were mandated by the First Amendment." Id. The Third
Draft of Blackmun's concurrence included language somewhat similar to that recommended by
Miller. However, this language does not appear in the published version of Justice Blackmun's
concurrence.
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"values." The appellate court accomplished this strange convolution by
the simple devise of holding that private broadcasters are
257
Government.

Someone, presumably Justice Brennan's clerk, wrote in the margin:
"No!,' "and explained that: "PS says if there is gov't action, broadcaster
is gov't & therefore loses all of his own 1st Amend. rts. But, we don't
say broadcasters are gov't, rather we say gov't is involved!, 258 Although
this passage is unchanged in the published version, Justice Stewart did
change another passage to accurately reflect Justice Brennan's
position.259
IV.

MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. v. TORNILL0260

Just about six weeks after the Court issued its decision in CBS
finding that groups such as the DNC had no right under the First
Amendment to have broadcast stations air editorial announcements, the
Supreme Court of Florida issued a decision finding that a state statute
giving political candidates the right to publish a reply in newspapers in
which they had been attacked did not violate the First Amendment. 26 1
A.

The FloridaSupreme Court

Pat Tornillo, Jr., the head of the teacher's union, was a
controversial candidate for the Florida House of Representatives. Twice
in September 1972, the Miami Herald printed editorials critical of
Tornillo's candidacy. Based on Florida Statute 104.38, a rarely-invoked

257. 1st Draft of Justice Potter Stewart, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., at 2 (circulated May 10, 1973), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 292, No. 71-863
to 71-866 (Library of Congress).
258. Id. at 1-2. Justice Brennan added a long footnote to his dissent explaining why, in his
view, Stewart's assertion that a finding of government action meant that private broadcasters were
government "reflected a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the governmental involvement
in this case." Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 182 n.12
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. Justice Stewart's first draft equated the dissenters' position with the respondent's point
that the Constitution required only that "responsible" parties be given the right to purchase
advertising. A handwritten note in the margin in the copy found in Justice Brennan's files objected
"No! WBJ never says this." The published version was changed to read that respondents argue
"somewhat differently" that the Constitution only required that responsible parties be allowed to
purchase time. Columbia Broad.Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring).
260. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
261. Id. at 245.
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"right of reply statute" that had been on262the books since 1913, Tornillo
demanded that the paper print his reply.

The Miami Herald refused and sought a declaration that the Florida
statute was unconstitutional. The Circuit Court agreed. Tomillo appealed
directly to the Florida Supreme Court where he was represented by
Jerome Barron. The Florida Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision
reversing the Circuit Court. In so doing, it relied on Red Lion in holding
that the Florida statute was constitutional.263 The Florida Court
concluded:
[W]e do not find that the operation of the statute would interfere with
freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States. Indeed it strengthens the concept in
that it presents both views leaving the reader the freedom to reach his
own conclusion. This decision will encourage rather than impede the
wide open and robust dissemination of ideas and counterthought which
the concept of free press both fosters and protects and which is
essential to intelligent self government.
Newspapers are not wholly dependent on electronic media as were
the broadcasters in [Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC]. However, we

have no difficulty in taking judicial notice that the publishers of
newspapers in this contemporary era would perish without this vital
source of communications. The dissemination of news other than
purely local is transmitted over telegraph wires or over air waves. This
not only includes dissemination of news but also in chain newspaper
operations so prevalent today, the Miami Herald being one; even
editorials are prepared in one place and transmitted electronically to
another. Therefore, the principles of law enunciated in [Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. 264FCC] have been taken into consideration in
reaching our opinion.

The concurring opinion of Justice Roberts, in which five other
justices joined, noted that the Florida Supreme Court was fully aware of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in CBS, but that CBS had in no way
"derogated the earlier opinion of that court" in Red Lion.265 Rather, CBS
was "directed solely to the peculiar and limited nature of broadcasting
266
frequencies, and that decision is not applicable" to the instant case.

262. Id. at 243-44.
263. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 83, 86-87 (Fla. 1973).
264. Id. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 87.
266. Id. at 87-88.
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The Miami Herald sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted
on January 14, 1974.267

B. The United States Supreme Court
1. The Briefs
The briefs on both sides discussed Red Lion and CBS. The Miami
Herald argued that the Florida statute was unconstitutional on its face
because it "substitutes governmental fiat for editorial freedom. 268 This
claim was immediately followed by a quote from CBS: "'For better or
worse, editing 9is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice
26
of material.'

The Miami Herald characterized the Florida Supreme Court
decision as relying heavily on the Red Lion decision. 27 0 But it charged
the state court "ignored the repeated statements ... in Red Lion itself,

and subsequently in [CBS], that the fairness doctrine is a narrow
exception to general First Amendment principles, applicable solely to
the broadcast media, and explicitly inapplicable to the press., 27 1 It
argued that CBS "held that broadcasters cannot constitutionally be
compelled to abdicate editorial discretion and accept material for
broadcast against their will. Afortiori, newspapers, with a greater range
of discretion, cannot be subjected to a compulsory publication rule. 272
Tornillo's brief, written by Professor Barron, responded that the
Florida statute did not restrain freedom of expression, but encouraged
freedom of expression. Citing the "fairness doctrine in broadcasting" as
one of "two famous examples," it argued that there was "no doubt that
legislation designed to protect freedom of expression is
constitutional., 273 However, the bulk of the brief focused not on Red
Lion, but on how the statute was consistent with the premises underlying

267.
268.

Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 414 U.S. 1142 (1974).
Brief of Appellant at 10, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tonillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No.

73-797).
269. Id. (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124
(1973)).
270. Id. at 20.
271. Id. at 21. The Miami Herald argued that while the "fairness doctrine" could be
constitutionally applied to broadcast stations, it could not be applied to newspapers because the
doctrine "rests solely on the unique technological limitations inherent in broadcast media." Id. at 8.
272. Id. at 23.
273. Brief of Appellee at 9, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No.
73-797). The other example was Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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2 74
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
Red Lion was primarily discussed in the section arguing that the Florida
statute was neither impermissibly vague nor unnecessarily broad.275 The
brief argued that the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the FCC's
fairness doctrine and personal attack rules were unconstitutionally
vague.2 76 It distinguished CBS on the ground that it was a "state action
case,'277 and argued that "[i]t would be completely erroneous to read the
CBS case as saying that government may never legislate to encourage
free debate. 278
Several amicus briefs devoted substantial space to addressing Red
Lion and the Fairness Doctrine. 279 The amicus brief filed by the Radio
Television News Director's Association (RTNDA) argued that
"[r]eversal in this case, without reaffirmance of the constitutionality of
the Fairness Doctrine, is important to the freedom of the electronic
press. ,280 It explained:

RTNDA agrees that in Red Lion the Court then believed that
broadcasting is significantly different [from newspapers] for these
purposes; it does not agree with any implication that this is a correct
evaluation and one that can continue to be relied upon to distinguish
Red Lion from cases like the one at bar.

274. See id. at 22-40 (arguing that the Florida right of reply statute is "entirely consistent with
the major premise of New York Times v. Sullivan" and that "[t]he First Amendment should be
interpreted to encourage 'debate on public issues').
275. Id. at 61-64.
276. Id. at 61-62. Red Lion is also used in responding to the claim made in an amicus brief
submitted by the Washington Post Co. that the Florida statute effected a "taking" of the newspaper's
property. Id. at 68-69; Brief for Washington Post Co., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 13,
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797).
277. Brief of Appellee, supra note 273, at 19.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, as Amicus Curiae at 3-20,
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797) (arguing that the rationale
for the Fairness Doctrine should not extend to newspapers, nor reaffirmed for broadcasting); Motion
for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for National Ass'n of Broadcasters Supporting
Appellant at 7-14, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797) (arguing
that the Florida statute is unconstitutional and that the Court should not base its ruling on the Red
Lion decision); Brief of the National Broadcasting Co., Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 3-12, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797) (arguing
that a state statute that compelled newspapers to print reply material that it does not wish to publish
violates the First Amendment); Brief of National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee at 23-43, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(No. 73-797) (arguing that the petitioner and its amici failed to demonstrate that the Florida
Legislature is prohibited by the First Amendment from balancing between competing First
Amendment interests).
280. Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, supranote 279, at 3.
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The danger of such a rationale, if it were adopted by this Court, is
that it would harden the holding of Red Lion even as knowledgeable
FCC officials, jurists and other persons in positions to know the
Doctrine are questioning the constitutionality
workings of the28Fairness
1
of the doctrine.
Thus, RTNDA urged that "[flor press freedom's sake, this Court
should, in reversing the judgment below, refrain from taking what may
appear to be the easy way out offered by those who believe they can
serve newspaper freedom by writing off the future freedom of
broadcasters. 282 Similarly, the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) argued that "the possible scope of the Red Lion decision has been
limited by [CBS]. Accordingly, any reliance upon Red Lion in
determining... the instant case would necessitate a step backwards in
decision which has since become subject to some
solidifying a ' 283
,
modification.
A public interest group, the National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting (NCCB), filed an amicus brief in support of Tornillo due
to its concern that the "First Amendment principles involved in this case
can potentially have a major impact on the public's right to obtain access
to diverse views. 284 NCCB's brief observed:
This Court has not previously confronted a constitutional challenge
to a legislative effort to balance the following two competing First
Amendment interests: (1) a newspaper's right to determine what it will
not print and (2) the voting public's right to receive information from
the widest possible range of sources, specifically, the electorate's right
to be fullK5 informed on electoral issues and the views of the
candidates.
the two First Amendment
It noted that "[o]rdinarily,
286
Here, however, given the "realities of
interests ... coincide.,
communication in a modem, industrialized society," newspapers such as
the Miami Herald hold the power to exclude information from the public
as well as inform it, thus causing injury to the First Amendment interest

281.

Id. at4.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Brief for National Ass'n of Broadcasters, supra note 279, at 10.
Brief for National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra note 279, at 2.
Id. at 10.
Id.at 11.
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in an informed electorate.287 In addition to urging the Court to uphold the
Florida statute, NCCB opposed the request of amici RTNDA and NAB
that the Court "decide the instant case without reference to Red Lion. 288
NCCB argued that "Red Lion's definition of the competing First
Amendment interests and their appropriateness for legislative resolution
2 89
cannot be avoided.,
2. The Opinions
All nine justices joined in the decision written by Chief Justice
Burger to reverse the Florida Supreme Court decision. Part I set forth the
facts of the case. Part II addressed the issue of finality. Part III
summarized the contentions of the parties, with Part III.A devoting
about a half page to the arguments of the Miami Herald and Part III.B
spending more than six pages discussing the arguments of Tornillo and
his supporters.29 °
Citing Professor Barron's article, Part III.B noted that the "appellee
and supporting advocates of an enforceable right of access to the press
vigorously argue that the government has an obligation to ensure that a
wide variety of views reach the public. 291 It observed that when the
First Amendment was ratified in 1791, "[e]ntry into publishing was
inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided meaningful alternatives to
the organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas.... A true
marketplace of ideas existed in which there was relatively easy access to
the channels of communication. 92 In contrast, today, "[n]ewspapers
have become big business," and the press had "become noncompetitive
and enormously powerful and influential in its capacity to manipulate
popular opinion and change the course of events. 29 3
The Court observed that the "obvious solution" would be to have
additional newspapers. "But the same economic factors which have
caused the disappearance of vast numbers of metropolitan newspapers,
have made entry into the marketplace of ideas served by the print media
almost impossible., 294 Therefore, the "only effective way to insure
287.

Id. at 12.

288. Id.
at 29.
289. Id. at 30. NCCB also points out that the result in CBS "was premised in large measure on
the continued existence and vitality of the broadcaster's 'public trustee' duty under the fairness
doctrine to meet the 'public interest in being fully and fairly informed."' Id.
290. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243-54 (1974).
291. Id. at 247-48 & 248 n.8.

292. Id. at 248.
293. Id. at 249.
294. Id. at 251.
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fairness and accuracy and to provide for some accountability is for
government to take affirmative action. '' 295 It noted that the "[p]roponents
of enforced access to the press take comfort" from several cases
suggesting that "the First Amendment acts as a sword as well as a shield,
that it imposes obligations on the owners of the296press in addition to
protecting the press from government regulation."
Despite the lengthy and sympathetic discussion of the arguments
for the public's right of access, Part IV found that: "However much
validity may be found in these arguments, at each point the
implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access
necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or
consensual.,, 297

The Court

stated that "the

problems

relating to

government-enforced access [were foreseen] as early as its decision in
[Associated Press]. '298 It quoted Part III in CBS for the point that the
power of privately owned newspapers is bounded only by the acceptance
of readers and the integrity of the publishers.29 9 It also noted that "[a]n
attitude strongly adverse to any attempt to extend a right of access to
newspapers was echoed by other Members of this Court in their separate
opinions in that case., 300 It concluded that the "clear implication" of
these cases is that the "compulsion to publish that which reason tells
them should not be published is unconstitutional. 3 1 While the Court
agreed that a responsible press is a desirable goal, it could not be
legislated.
The Court rejected Tornillo's argument that the right-of-reply
statute did not prevent the Miami Herald from saying whatever it wished
as "beg[ging] the core question., 30 2 The Court explained that requiring a
newspaper to publish a reply exacted a penalty based on content "in
terms of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in
taking up space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper
may have preferred to print., 30 3 The Court noted: "It is correct, as
appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the finite

295. Id.
296. Id. Here the Court discusses Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945),
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29,47 & n.15 (1971), but not RedLion. Id. at 251-52.

297.

Id. at 254.

298.

Id.

299. Id. at 255.
300. Id. (citing Stewart's concurring opinion and Brennan's dissenting opinion).
301. Id. at 256 (internal quotations omitted).
302.
303.

Id.
Id.
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technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster but it is not
correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to
infinite expansion of column space to accommodate the replies .... "304
The Court was concerned that editors might well conclude that the
"safe course is to avoid controversy" and to blunt or reduce electoral
coverage.3 °5 Moreover, even if the statute imposed no additional cost, it
still violated the First Amendment because it intruded into the function
of editors. As the Court noted, "[a] newspaper is more than a passive
30 6
receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Rehnquist, issued a short
concurrence, noting that he joined the decision with the understanding
that it addressed only "right of reply" statutes, not "retraction" statutes
that allow a successful plaintiff in a defamation case to require
publication of a retraction. 30 7 Justice White (who had written the
decision in Red Lion) issued a somewhat longer concurring decision.
Without mentioning Red Lion, he distinguished newspapers from
broadcasting in that a "newspaper or magazine is not a public utility
subject to 'reasonable' governmental regulation in matters affecting the
exercise of a journalistic judgment as to what shall be printed. 30 8 In his
view, the Florida statute ran "afoul of the elementary First Amendment
proposition that government may not force a newspaper to print copy
which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom
floor., 30 9 However, he emphasized that while free to publish without
censorship, newspapers were not entirely free from liability for what
they chose to print. He went on to express concern that Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.3 0 had gone too far in protecting newspapers against libel. 3 '

304. Id. at 256-57.
305. Id.at 257.
306. Id. at 258.
307. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). He quotes Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966), about regarding how, under the Constitution, the press was designed to serve as antidote to
government abuses of power. Id. at 259-60. While the press is not always accurate or fair, "the
balance struck by the First Amendment with respect to the press is that society must take the risk
that occasionally debate on vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not
be expressed." Id. at 260.
309. Id. at 261.
310. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
311. Miami Herald Publ'gCo., 418 U.S. at 262.
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C. Insightsfrom the Justices' Papers
In rereading Miami Herald, it struck me that the decision treats
many of Barron's ideas sympathetically and at great length. This made
me wonder whether there was some possibility that the case could have
been decided differently. I also had hoped to discover why Miami
Herald not only failed to distinguish Red Lion, but neglected to even
mention or cite the case.31 2 Much of the scholarship in communications
law has addressed the inconsistencies between the Supreme Court's
1974 unanimous decision
1969 unanimous decision in Red Lion and its
313
in Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo.
1. Could the Decision Have Come Out Differently?
The Chief Justice's lengthy discussion of Tornillo's arguments
prompted Justice Blackmun's clerk to comment that "this is the only
opinion I've seen this year that spends more space discussing the losing
arguments. 3 14 However, I found no support in the Justices' papers for
the theory that the Chief Justice may have originally written a decision
upholding the Florida Supreme Court and later changed his mind.
Of course, had the majority agreed with the Florida Supreme Court,
it could have denied certiorari or disposed of the case on nonconstitutional grounds. The papers in Blackmun's files make clear that
the Court wanted to hear the case on the merits. The Court held a
conference in January to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court's
decision was final. The Court decided to postpone consideration of
312. See, e.g., STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
166 (2001). In the notes following Red Lion, this case book observes that Miami Herald contained
no discussion or even cite to Red Lion, and yet, "[a]t first blush, at least, all the arguments rejected
in Red Lion seem to be the very ones accepted in Tornillo." Id. It asks if the Court declined to cite
Red Lion because the two cases cannot be reconciled or because broadcasting has no bearing on
print, and whether the Court was behaving irresponsibly or simply exercising restraint. Id. See also
THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 155 (2d ed. 1998)
("Amazingly, the Court's 1974 Tornillo opinion contains no discussion of the 1969 Red Lion
decision."); FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GuyS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 195 (1975) ("There seemed to be a stunning

contradiction between the two cases, and communications lawyers read the Tornillo opinion in a
futile search for a Red Lion citation."); Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976)
("What seems so remarkable about the unanimous Miami Heraldopinion is the complete absence of
any reference to the Court's unanimous decision five years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC.").
313. See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 312, at 4.
314. Memorandum from RR [Robert I. Richter] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Circulation
by the Chief Justice (June 3, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress).
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jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 315 An unidentified memo, which
appears to be a clerk's summary of the reply regarding the finality
question, observed that the Court could avoid the question by finding the
decision non-final, but argued that the case was important enough that
the Court should find it final.3" 6 Similarly the bench memo by Robert I.
Richter, which recommended finding the judgment final, pointed out
that the Court could "gracefully avoid the merits if for some reason it
feels the time is not proper to reach this issue. ' 317 Justice Blackmun's
own memo indicated:
Of course, decision on the main issue could easily be avoided if we
choose to say that the judgment is not final. That would be an easy
way out. While the case is not so easy as Mills on the finality point, I
am inclined to go along with Mills and decide the constitutional
issue.318
The memos from Blackmun's clerk suggested excitement about
taking the case because of the importance of the issue and the fact that
Jerome Barron would be arguing it. Richter's memo for the November
30, 1974 conference on whether to grant a stay noted that the lawyer
arguing in support of the Florida statute is "Jerome Barron, who is the
biggest academic booster of the fairness doctrine and its broad
application. He could make a good fight out of the case on the merits. 3 19
Richter's bench memo similarly mentioned that the "Appellee is
represented by Prof. Jerome Barron, the academic father of right-toreply theory, so the case is effectively presented on behalf of the statute.

315.

Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 414 U.S. 1142 (1974).

316. See PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73797 (Library of Congress) (the document is titled "Reply of App't on Question of Finality").
317. Bench Memorandum from Robert I. Richter to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: The
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, at 13 (Apr. 10, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A.
BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Richter Bench Memo].
318. Memorandum of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: No. 73-797 - Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tomillo, at 2 (Apr. 15, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Justice Blackmun's Apr. 15,
1974 Memo]. Justice Blackmun notes that the other defenses that might be raised on remand were
not significant and that the constitutional issue was "for all practical purposes, the decision of the
case." Id. at 2-3. Also, taking the case would prevent a long and expensive trial. Id. at 3.
319. Memorandum from RR [Robert 1. Richter] to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Miami
Herald v. Tomillo (Nov. 29, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File,

1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Richter Memo].
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Unfortunately, the best direct authority for the arguments are Barron's
own scholarly articles. 32 °
Justice Blackmun's memo suggested some sympathy for Tornillo's
position. He noted that Tornillo's claim that the Florida statute
encouraged rather than inhibited speech was "a plausible and appealing
possibility. 3 21 Blackmun further added:
We are, however, dealing with newspapers here. Much as I detest their
deficiencies and their slanting of news, particularly here in the East
(Washington and New York), the fact is that it has never been the
province of the Government to insure that newspapers present the
news fairly. For better or for worse, by the First Amendment, we have
opted for the free press.322
He found that:
Obviously, the objective of Florida here is a high and lofty one.
Nevertheless, a newspaper has never been considered a public utility.
We have to accept them for what they are, warts and all. I would like
to be able to say that if the situation gets reprehensibly unacceptable,
then perhaps something is in order. I doubt if that will be possible
under the First Amendment, but I suspect that it is a risk we must take
and that I, for one, am willing to take.
But Justice Blackmun also noted that it was "possible that a statute
of this kind really inhibits or impairs the freedom of the press. I think
what we are talking about, really, is the independence of the press. I am
willing to maintain it."'32 4 With respect to the argument that Florida was
serving the compelling state interest in preserving the election process,
Justice Blackmun commented: "Perhaps so, but no other State has
chosen to preserve the election process in this manner." 325 Ultimately, he
concluded that "on the main issue, I am ready to reverse despite my
personal exasperation at times with the local press. But this is a
of our governmental structure and I am willing to
foundation ' stone
326
it.
preserve

320. Richter Bench Memo, supra note 317, at 2.
321. Justice Blackmun's Apr. 15, 1974 Memo, supra note 318, at 6.
322. Id. at 6-7.
323. Id. at 7.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 8. This argument is similar to that made by his clerk, Richter, that were the Court to
affirm, it would cause major changes in American journalism. See infra note 352 and accompanying
text.
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At the end of the memo, Justice Blackmun speculated on the
Court's action:
If we reverse, little will be changed. If we affirm, however, there
necessarily will be an adjustment in American journalism. The courts
will be involved. They will have to determine constantly when the
reply obligation attaches under the statute. This could be avoided by

the courts
by having administrative bodies set up. This is not so
327
good.

He added, "[t]his is a difficult one, but I would not mind having a
case of substance for a change this term. I have been given minor and
statutory controversies. 328
At the oral argument held on April 17, 1974,329 Justice Blackmun

reportedly said, "I want to ask a question-no, I guess I want to make a
statement-for better or for worse we have opted in this country for a
free press, not fair debate., 330 Yet, Justice Blackmun was apparently
favorably impressed by Professor Barron's performance at oral
1
argument, which he graded "A-.1 33332
Daniel Paul, who argued for the
"B-.,
a
only
Miami Herald, received
At the conference vote taken two days after the oral argument,

Justice Blackmun voted to reverse the Florida Supreme Court. His notes
show a negative sign indicating that a vote for reversal next to each
Justice except Justice Powell, which was left blank.3 33 Under Powell's
name, Blackmun wrote: "A flagrant intrusion on the press. But what's
33 4
greater monopoly? Congress ought to place them under antitrust.

Under the Chief Justice's heading, Blackmun noted: "telling what they
must publish is equivalent to what they cannot." Under Justice Stewart's
name, he wrote: "[C]an be a contradiction between free speech and free
press. [P]aper different from media radio bands. [I]mpossible to start a
327. Justice Blackmun's Apr. 15, 1974 Memo, supra note 318, at 8.
328. Id.
329. For discussion of the oral argument, see FRIENDLY, supra note 312, at 194; L.A. Powe,
Jr., Tornillo, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 345, 372.
330. FRIENDLY, supra note 312, at 194.
331. Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun from Oral Argument in Miami Herald Publ'g v.
Tomillo (Apr. 17, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999,
Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress).
332. Id.
333. Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun from Conference Vote on Miami Herald Publ'g v.
Tomillo (Apr. 19, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999,
Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress). The minus sign appearing about half way down the box
under Justice Marshall's name indicates Justice Blackmun's vote. Id.
334. Id. (as discerned as best as possible from Justice Blackmun's handwritten notes, which
include ambiguous abbreviations).
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is very limited. [B]ut state cannot do
newspaper. [T]herefore, spectrum
' 335
literalist.
a
be
to
have
I
this.
Despite Justice Blackmun's desire to draft the opinion, the Chief
Justice assigned the task of writing the opinion to himself. The Chief
Justice circulated four drafts, with the first dated June 3, 1974.336 Despite
the number of drafts, there are no significant substantive differences
between the first draft and final opinion issued June 25, 1974. 337 In
particular, Part IIl.B, which summarized Tornillo's arguments, was
virtually unchanged from the first draft to the published version.3 38
The lack of changes may be explained in part by the shortness of
time. The first draft was circulated on June 3, 1974, very close to the end
of the term. Justice Douglas joined on the very day that the first draft
day, 340
was circulated. 339 Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined the next
335. Id.
336. First Draft (June 3, 1974); Second Draft (June 5, 1974); Third Draft (June 11, 1974);
Fourth Draft (June 20, 1974), in PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 331, No. 73-797 (Library of
Congress).
337. One of the biggest changes was to the opening paragraph. The first draft starts:
We set this case for plenary consideration to determine the constitutionality under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of a state statute which grants
an electoral candidate a right to demand from a newspaper which criticizes the
candidate's character or official record, equal space in the newspaper to reply to the
charges made.
1st Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, at I (circulated June 3, 1973), in PAPERS OF
HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of
Congress). In contrast, the published opinion begins: "The issue in this case is whether a state
statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his
record by a newspaper, violates the guarantees of a free press." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974). The fourth draft elaborates the point that enforcing a right of
access could cause editors to reduce political and electoral coverage by adding a quote from Mills v.
Alabama at the end of the second to the last paragraph, right after the quote from New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan about dampening the vigor of public debate. 4th Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co.
v. Tomillo, at 16 (recirculated June 20, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court
File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress). The quote states that "there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course include discussions of candidates." Id.
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 216 (1966)).
338. One sentence referring to the "First Amendment right of the public to be informed," was
changed to the "First Amendment interest of the public in being informed." Compare 1st Draft of
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, at 10 (circulated June 3, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A.
BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress) (emphasis
added) with Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added). In the next paragraph, the phrase
"Proponents of guaranteedaccess" was changed to "Proponents of enforced access." Id.
339. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (June
3, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73797 (Library of Congress).
340. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: No. 73797 - Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo (June 4, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A.
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and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined a few days later on June 6,
1974.341 Justice Marshall joined on June 13, 1974.342

In sum, it seems that the Court took the case on the merits, even
though it could have avoided doing so on the ground that the decision
was not yet final, because it thought the case presented an important
question that would be well argued on both sides. Before the oral
argument, Justice Blackmun's memo reflected concerns about the power
of the press and sympathy for the goal of the Florida statute as well as
those treated unfairly by the press. Yet, he ultimately came out on the
side of the traditional conception of the First Amendment.343
After oral argument, no Justice voted to uphold the Florida
Supreme Court. Moreover, there was little change between the first draft
circulated by the Chief Justice and the published opinion. The other
Justices promptly signed on without any of the back and forth that
occurred in the CBS case. Thus, I found no evidence suggesting that the
outcome in this case was ever in doubt.
2. The Relevance of Red Lion
I also found nothing in the Blackmun papers indicating why Red
Lion was not cited in Miami Herald.If anything, because the memos of
Justice Blackmun and the law clerks clearly regarded Red Lion as
providing the major support for Tornillo's position, the failure of the
draft and published opinions to distinguish or discuss Red Lion seems all
the more strange.

BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Justice Stewart's June 4, 1974 Memo]; Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun
to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: No. 73-797 - Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo (June
4, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73797 (Library of Congress). Justice Stewart stated that he might write a brief concurring opinion.
Justice Stewart's June 4, 1974 Memo, supra.
341. Memorandum from Justice Lewis Powell to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: No. 73797 Miami Herald v. Tomillo (June 6, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court
File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress); Memorandum from Justice William
H. Rehnquist to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: No. 73-797 - Miami Herald v. Tomillo (June
6, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73797 (Library of Congress).
342. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re:
No. 73-797 - The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo (June 13, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY
A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress). I did
not find any correspondence from either Justice Brennan or Justice White. I did find early drafts of
their concurring opinions, but they did not differ significantly from the published version.
343. Justice Blackmun's Apr. 15, 1974 Memo, supra note 318, at 8.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/5

60

Campbell: A Historical Perspective on the Public's Right of Access to the M
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2007]

a.

The Memos

The memos by law clerks repeatedly referred to Red Lion. For
example, Justice Powell circulated a memo by his clerk regarding a
request to stay the Florida Supreme Court decision. The memo noted
that the state court had cited Red Lion as standing for the proposition
that the purpose of the First Amendment is to preserve an uninhibited
market place of ideas.344 It also described the appellant as arguing that
the Florida decision below was wrong because it relied on the Court's
upholding the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion and CBS, when the Fairness
Doctrine could be sustained "only because of the unique characteristics
of electronic communication., 345 This memo also noted that while dicta
in Red Lion suggested that the Fairness Doctrine346would be inapplicable
to the press, the issue was "not free from doubt.
Richter's bench memo for Justice Blackmun recommended
reversal, but noted that Tornillo had presented some "strong
contentions" and that "Appellee's strongest argument seems to be the
Red Lion case." 347 The other two arguments were based on CBS and
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.

34 8

Richter observed that Justice White "was extremely careful in Red
Lion to limit the case to broadcasting, where the limited frequencies and

government licensing create a unique First Am[endment] situation and
the simple answer to appellee's Red Lion argument is that it only applies
to broadcasting. '349 But, he noted that "much language in Justice
344. Memorandum from James B. Ginty to Justice Lewis Powell, Re: January 11,1974
Conference, at 2 (Nov. 20, 1973), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 19181999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Ginty Memo]. Like the Ginty Memo,
a preliminary memo dated January 2, 1974, which was prepared for the January 11, 1974
conference, notes that the Florida Supreme Court relied heavily on Red Lion and the Appellant
argued that Red Lion should be limited to broadcasters. Preliminary Memorandum, Re: January 11,
1974 Conference, at 3-4, in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box
189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress).
345. Ginty Memo, supra note 344, at 3.
346. Id. at 4. Ginty concludes that he would be inclined to grant the stay even though there was
no immediate danger of significant injury. Id. Justice Powell's cover memo notes that after
conferring with the Chief Justice, he granted a temporary stay and "in view of the importance of the
case," referred the matter to the November 30, 1973 conference. Justice Blackmun's clerk, Robert
Richter, thought the issue of whether to grant the stay was "tough," but on balance agreed with
Ginty. After reviewing the reply to the stay application, Richter recommended in a supplemental
memo that Powell's stay be continued since the appellee did not object. Richter Memo, supra note
319.
347. Richter Bench Memo, supra note 317, at 15.
348. See id. 16-17.
349. Id. at 15.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

61

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1027

White's opinion" supported Tomillo's position. For example,

in

concluding that the Fairness Doctrine advanced rather than inhibited
public debate, the Red Lion decision supported Tornillo's claim that the
Florida right to reply statute enhanced public debate. Moreover, the Red
Lion decision rejected a "vagueness challenge similar to the one
advanced by [Miami Herald]., 350 Richer suggested:
Although Red Lion was emphatically limited to broadcasting, if the
[Court] wanted to, it is not an impossible task to argue that the same
considerations apply to the press, where there is one newspaper in
most cities. Although newspapers are, in fact, at least as scarce as
broadcasting frequencies today in most places, newspapers are not now
and hopefully will never be subject to a licensing requirement.
Broadcasters, by technological necessity exist at the behest of the
[government]. From this necessity flows the obligations such as the
Fairness Doctrine which serves as a check on the [government] control
as much as it does on the broadcaster. Newspapers have always
depended on an existence free of government] control and for that
reason, I would not extend Red Lion to cover the press.351
Richter cited several other reasons for not extending Red Lion to
newspapers. He concluded:
If the case is reversed, the effects will not be profound. The press will
remain as it is, good and bad, with no fairness obligations. If the case is
affirmed the implications will be somewhat more significant,
particularly if the Congress or other states follow the lead of [Florida].
Assuming this occurs, I think
that the nature of American journalism
352
will be significantly altered.
Richter was troubled by "the specter of pervasive judicial
supervision" or in the alternative, the possibility of an FCC-like
administrative body at the state level.353 He pointed out that broadcast
journalists viewed the Fairness Doctrine as inhibiting television
reporting. Thus, "[w]hile this cost might be necessary in broadcasting, it
would be a shame to carry it over to the press where there is no
governmental licensing. 3 54 He also thought that Barron's brief assumed

350.

Id.

351. Id. at 15-16.
352. Id. at 21. He cites as an example, that partisan, ideological journals and newspapers would
be forced to open their editorial pages to opposing viewpoints. Id. at 21-22.
353. Id. at 22.
354. Id.
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that all newspapers were inherently irresponsible and beholden to
political interest groups, when in his view, most were responsible. 355
Justice Blackmun's memo agreed with much of Richter's analysis.
For example, he considered the same three prior decisions, Red Lion,
CBS, and Rosenbloom. He noted that Red Lion was of "primary"
significance, and described it as holding that the Fairness Doctrine "did
not violate the First Amendment., 356 Blackmun noted: "The amendment
is relevant to public broadcasting, but what is paramount is the right of
the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters.
The First Amendment does not protect private censorship by the
broadcasters. 3 57 He observed that while Red Lion was a unanimous
decision, Justice Douglas had not participated.358
Justice Blackmun next described CBS as holding "that neither the
Communications Act nor the First Amendment requires broadcasters to
accept paid editorial advertisements., 359 He noted that the "Court was
somewhat3 60fractionated on the routes by which this conclusion was
reached.
After discussing these cases, Justice Blackmun noted that the
Florida statute was "the only one of its kind," and that "[s]trangely
enough," it had been challenged only recently despite being on the books
since 1913.361 Next, he noted:
In simplistic terms, the statute would force the private newspaper to
print material it does not want to print. And this is so even with nonlibelous material. We have gone far with New York Times and its
progeny in protecting the press from law suits for libel, and have
allowed those suits to proceed only in the face of actual malice where
public officials, public figures, and now, perhaps, public issues are
involved. How may we protect there and not protect here? The easy
answer is to say that the New York Times and its reasoning compels a
reversal here. That would do the job and be a brief and easy solution.
There are, however, some opposing arguments, and, in my view,
they deserve mention and full treatment.

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Justice Blackmun's Apr. 15, 1974 Memo, supra note 318, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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1. The first is the reliance by the appellee on the Red Lion case. It
says in almost so many words that the fairness doctrine advances rather
than inhibits public debate. It also rejects a vagueness challenge similar
to the one advanced by the newspaper here. One can draw a parallel
between limiting broadcasting bans on the one hand and single
newspaper municipalities on the other. Yet there is a difference.
Newspapers are not licensed and never have been. Broadcasters, by
physical necessity, are licensed, and exist by permission of the
Government. Newspapers in this country have always been free of
governmental control. Perhaps the answer to Red Lion is that it is, and
should be, limited to broadcasters. There are only so many frequencies
available. The fairness doctrine is bred from necessity.
2. The CBS case of last term deserves passing mention. The result
there, that the First Amendment does not require broadcasters to accept
paid advertisements on political subjects, clearly supports the
newspaper here. On the other hand, the primary ground of the decision
was that the FCC had not required this, and there was an implication
that if the FCC had required it, the result
362 possibly might be different.
The case is probably not fatal, however.
b.

The Draft Opinions

As discussed above, there was little change between the Chief
Justice's first draft circulated on June 3, 1974, and the published
opinion. None of the four drafts mentioned or cited Red Lion even
though they mentioned the other cases that Justice Blackmun's memo
identified as relevant.363 For example, Part III.B, which summarized
Tornillo's contentions, quoted language from New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, recognizing "'a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-

362. Id. at 5-6. The third point he discusses is the implication in Rosenbloom that a right of
reply statute as an alternative to libel suits would be constitutional. Justice Blackmun notes that
while he joined in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, he did not feel bound by the implication and
suggests that Rosenbloom could be limited to libel cases. Id.
363. Because the four drafts are similar, these examples are drawn from the first draft. For
example, in Part Il.B which summarizes Tornillo's contentions, the draft refers to New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan and the plurality decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 1st Draft of Miami
Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, at 11 (circulated June 3, 1974), in PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN,

Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 189, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter 1st Draft
of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo]. This paragraph is unchanged in the published decision.
Compare id. with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974).
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open.1,364 It also noted that Tornillo cited the plurality decision in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,365 suggesting that it "seemed to invite
experimentation
by the States in right to access regulation of the
6
36

press.

CBS was discussed in Part IV, which quoted a passage from the
plurality opinion in Part III of CBS:
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own
political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors:
first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence
advertisers-to assure financial success;
and, second, the journalistic
367
integrity of its editors and publishers.
It went on to observe, "[a]n attitude strongly adverse to any attempt

to extend a right of access to newspapers was echoed by several
members of this Court in their separate opinions in that case. 365 The
footnote to this sentence quotes passages from the concurring opinion of
Justice Stewart and the dissent of Justice Brennan.369
Not only was there no mention of Red Lion in the Chief Justice's

draft opinion for the Court, but there was no mention of it in the drafts of
the concurring opinions circulated by Justices Brennan and White. 370 I
was particularly surprised that Justice White, who wrote the Red Lion
decision, failed to mention Red Lion. Instead of focusing on the
inconsistent treatment of the right of reply under Red Lion and Miami
Herald, Justice White complained that Miami Herald, along with

364. 1st Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, supra note 363, at 11 (quoting
NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). New York Times is cited again in Part
IV of the draft, which rejects an enforceable right of access as inconsistent with the First
Amendment. The draft states: "Government enforced right of access, appellant argues, inescapably
'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate."' Id. at 16 (citing New York Times Co.,
376 U.S. at 279). The published decision drops the phrase "appellant argues." Compare id. with
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
365. 1st Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, supra note 363, at 11.
366. Id. This paragraph is unchanged in the published decision. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
367. 1st Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, supra note 363, at 13-14 (quoting
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)).
368. Id. at 14. In the published opinion, the word "several" is changed to "other." Compare id.
with Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 255.
369. 1st Draft of Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, supra note 363, at 14 n.23. The quote
from Justice Brennan points out that unlike electronic media, the newspaper industry is not
extensively regulated. Id.
370. Justice Brennan's papers included two drafts of his concurring opinion and two drafts, one
typewritten and another one labeled first draft, of Justice White's concurring opinion. See PAPERS
OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Box 331, No. 73-797 (Library of Congress). The drafts and the published
opinions in both cases are virtually identical.
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another case decided the same day, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 3 7 1 made
it very difficult for private citizens who were libeled to obtain any
remedy.372
Thus, it appears that the decision to not discuss Red Lion, if indeed
it was consciously made, occurred before any draft opinions were
circulated. While Justice Blackmun's memo indicates that he would
have preferred to limit Red Lion to broadcasting, there is nothing in his
papers explaining why the Court chose to refrain from making this
obvious distinction.
c.

A Possible Explanation

While the Justices' papers do not explain why the decision in
Tornillo fails to distinguish or even cite Red Lion, Fred Friendly, the
former President of CBS news, has offered an explanation in his book:
The omission was no accident. Several of the Justices wished to
explain why Red Lion Broadcasting and the rest of the broadcast
industry were not entitled to the protections accorded to the Miami
Herald under the First Amendment, but Chief Justice Burger and the
majority thought it essential to make Tornillo a unanimous decision.
However, the inclusion of language in Tornillo reaffirming Red Lion as
being a different problem because of the scarcity issue would have cost
the votes of Douglas and Stewart. Douglas, who supported the Miami
Herald absolutely, made it clear that he would not vote for an opinion
37 3
which would have the effect of strengthening the Fairness Doctrine.
Because I had access only to the papers of three Justices, and even
those are likely incomplete, it is impossible to reconstruct what actually
happened. Justice Blackmun's papers do suggest that he drew a
distinction between Red Lion and Miami Herald in his own thinking, but
I found no evidence that he sought to have the opinion written to reflect
that distinction.

371. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
372. Professor Bernard W. Bell, who served as Justice White's clerk in the 1982 term, has
argued that the court's failure to distinguish Red Lion in Tornillo was not so remarkable, and that
"Justice White's jurisprudence suggests his answer to these critics' claims that Red Lion and
Tornillo conflict: Red Lion involved use of a government resource while Tornillo did not." Bernard
W. Bell, Judging in Interesting Time: The Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R.
White, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 893, 907 (2003).
373. FRIENDLY, supra note 312, at 195. Friendly cites no sources for this claim.
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Moreover, I found nothing suggesting that the Chief Justice would
have been troubled by losing Justice Douglas's vote.374 Even if Justice
Douglas would not have voted for an opinion that would have had the
effect of strengthening the Fairness Doctrine, at most, he would have
written a concurrence, not a dissent. On the other hand, the Chief Justice
may have been anxious to avoid a repeat of the experience in CBS, with
all of its separate opinions. In his concurring opinion in CBS, Douglas
had demonstrated both his strong disagreement with Red Lion and his
willingness to draft a highly critical concurrence. Thus, nothing in the
Justices' papers either undermines or supports Friendly's account of the
Supreme Court's failure to cite Red Lion in Miami Herald.
V.

CONCLUSION

Barron's insight that constitutional law is anomalous in protecting
expression but indifferent to creating opportunities for expression is
evident in the Supreme Court's decisions in both CBS and Miami
Herald.Despite expansive language about the public's First Amendment
rights in Red Lion, the Court declined to extend the public's rights
beyond what the Fairness Doctrine required in CBS and it declined to
extend the right to reply to newspapers in Miami Herald.
The papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Douglas help
explain the lack of consensus that led to six different opinions in CBS.
They show that the Chief Justice sought to convince the other Justices to
reject the First Amendment claims for lack of state action, due to his
concern that finding state action would set a precedent for finding state
action in a variety of other contexts, including newspapers. 375 However,
only Justices Stewart and Rehnquist ended up joining this part of the
decision.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, concurred stating that
it was unnecessary to decide the state action issue because even
assuming state action, the Fairness Doctrine sufficiently protected the
public's First Amendment right to a diversity of views. Justice White
also concurred, suggesting that he thought there was state action, but that
the First Amendment had not been violated.

374. It was not unusual for Justice Douglas to dissent. During his long tenure on the Court,
from 1939 to 1975, he dissented in nearly forty percent of the cases. James Ryerson, Dirty Rotten
Hero, N.Y. T!MES, Apr. 13, 2003, § 7 (Book Review), at 19.
375. See discussion supra Part I1(C) (analyzing Justice Blackmun's papers and the positions
taken by the Justices in deciding CBS).
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Justice Douglas initially drafted a dissent, but changed it to a
concurring opinion after the Chief Justice circulated his opinion finding
no government action. Justice Douglas's often-cited concurring opinion,
which argued that Red Lion was wrongly decided and that broadcasters
should not be treated differently than newspapers under the First
Amendment, thus appears to have been premised on a "holding" of no
government action that in the end, failed to gamer five votes.
Although the majority in CBS placed great reliance on the Fairness
Doctrine and Red Lion to conclude that the Constitution did not require
broadcast stations to accept paid editorials, when asked to review the
constitutionality of a right-to-reply statute similar to the Fairness
Doctrine in Miami Herald, the Court unanimously found the Florida
right-to-reply statute unconstitutional.376 Although both Part IIL.B of the
opinion for the Court, and Justice Blackmun's memo evinced sympathy
toward Barron's argument that a public right of access was needed
because modern, monopoly newspapers could control and even distort
public discussion, the Justices were unwilling to depart from the
traditional (in Barron's terms "romantic") notion that freedom of
expression is best advanced by keeping the government's hands off
newspapers.
It is clear from his papers that Justice Blackmun recognized the
tension between Red Lion and Miami Herald and thought that Red Lion
should be limited to broadcasting.377 Yet, neither the opinion for the
Court nor the two concurring opinions, in either draft or final form,
distinguish or even cite Red Lion. Unfortunately, nothing in the Justices'
papers directly explain the reason for this omission.

376. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
377. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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